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Hypothesis
In the world conflicts the European Union is a competent partner for the UN in the field o f 
crisis management in spite o f different agendas, policies and vocations.
Objectives
• Analyse necessity of a partnership and coherence among national and international 
actors
• Analyse important steps that have taken place in the last years at both the political and 
institutional level and which have had significant influence on the EU-UN relations 
development
• Analyse prospects for operational level cooperation and concerns connected
• Present scenarios providing models for the UN trend of involving the EU in the 
operations where force is used are presented
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• Determine steps that have taken to make the EU-UN crisis management more efficient 
and generally develop capabilities of the collaboration in conflict management
• Evaluate cooperation of the EU and the UN in operations Artemis and EUFOR RD 
Congo in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and analyse successes and failures
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Methodology
Qualitative analysis is applied to evaluate whether the particular cooperation between the EU 
and the UN has been successful enough and whether the EU was and still is a competent 
partner for the UN. The analysis will be led according to two sets of criteria. The first set of 
criteria comes from the case study of Darya Pushkina in which she determines the reasons for 
successes and failures of certain missions. The second set of criteria comes from practical 
steps of the EU and UN which they have taken in recent years in order to formalize their 
relationship.
Case study analysis is applied to show the advantages gained from strengthened partnership 
where the EU shall prove itself as a competent actor.
Literature, sources:
• Farrell, M.(2006): EU Representation and Coordination within the United Nations, 
Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales
• Galtung (1976) in Martin A. Sola, The Contribution of Critical Theory to New 
Thinking on Peacekeeping, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Department of Peace 
Studies July 2005
• Major, C.(2008): 'EU-UN Cooperation in Crisis Management: the experience of
EUFOR RD Congo in 2006, Institute of Security Studies, EU
• Nzongola-Ntalaja G. (2007): ‘Leasons Learned from the Artemis and EUFOR
Operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo‘, Security & Defence Agenda
Discussion Paper The EU’s Africa Strategy: What are the lessons of the Congo
mission?
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1 Introduction
The organisation of the United Nations was founded as the follower of the League of 
Nations in order to prevent immense conflicts on a global scale; keeping international peace 
and security has remained for six decades one of the main missions of the organisation. Since 
its foundation, the United Nations have helped prevent numerous wars when convincing the 
adversary parties to negotiate, it was mainly the Security Council, the main body of the UN 
for the issues of international peace and security, that has made the most important decisions1. 
It can be said the Second World War showed the necessity for civilian presence and it took a 
very long time to strengthen this capability of the international community. It was the UN that 
included the lack of preparedness for its post-modern tasks. It can be said the UN as an 
architect of the concept of peacekeeping is the most important institution to deal with crisis 
management, nevertheless crisis management still lacked the civilian feature and then there 
appeared difficulties to respond efficiently to the conflict . At the beginning of peacekeeping 
missions, the main task was to supervise cease fires with complete impartiality and with the 
condition to use force only for self-defence. Nevertheless, traditional UN approach to 
peacekeeping was not efficient and the responses were not appropriate . As a consequence, 
some conflicts evolved in genocide or ethnic cleansing4. In this case, cease fires and peace 
agreements did not assure stability but nor did not end the violence. Subsequently, NATO 
came up with peace support operations where force was used and this approach was later used
1 UN Security Council: Background: http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_background.html (accessed 15/05)
2 Malone David M., The UN Security Council (2004): 'From the Cold War to the 21st Century, International 
Peace Academy', p. 26
3 Spillmann, K., Bemauer, T., Gabriel, JM., Wenger, A. eds. (2001): 'Peace Support Operations: Lessons 
Learned and Future Perspectives', p. 23
4 Spillmann, K., Bemauer, T., Gabriel, JM., Wenger, A. eds. (2001): 'Peace Support Operations: Lessons 
Learned and Future Perspectives', p. 23
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also in UN missions. Force was used in the UN missions since the 1950's but general opinion 
was still against force, nevertheless, afterwards, there were serious failures, such as in 
Somalia and in the Balkans where the UN devoted its missions to the humanitarian issues5.
In the Cold War period, the United Nations started to promote strongly crisis 
management. In my thesis crisis management will be used for numerous parts of 
contemporary peacekeeping. Crisis management comprises numerous factors, military, 
civilian and humanitarian. An objective of military missions is security, civilian actors are 
unarmed conflicts and comprise security sector reform but also aim to reform the 
infrastructure and main objective of humanitarian actors is take care of the victims of the 
conflict. Conflicts occurring nowadays need to involve all three elements. It can be said when 
one of them is omitted, the mission is not likely to be successful. The reason is the mandates 
of the missions have also expanded which is a consequence of rising recognition of crisis 
management and necessity for peace promotion in other ways than militarily. Consequently, 
civilian element became an essential part in a conflict response6.
According to Martin, it was considered the product of power politics and a way how to 
maintain 'friendly regimes' and promote economic interests7. On the other hand, it has to be 
noted that interventions were realized by impartial and smaller countries and had a high 
chance to achieve a conflict resolution. According to Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, there are 
two general approaches in relation to the debate that express the best the role of the United 
Nations in contemporary times. The UN may be considered the main representative of the
5 Spillmann, K., Bemauer, T., Gabriel, JM., Wenger, A. eds. (2001): 'Peace Support Operations: Lessons 
Learned and Future Perspectives', p. 23
6 McCallum, B. (2009): 'EU Civilian Crisis Management : A Vehicle for EU International Actomess, Dalhousie 
University
7 Martin, A. Sola (2005): The Contribution of Critical Theory to New Thinking on Peacekeeping', Centre for 
Conflict Resolution, Department of Peace Studies p. 7, accessed at 
http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/confres/papers/pdfs/CCR15.pdf. 05/05
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International community as a whole which is created for the purposes of great power politics, 
notably the United States8. According to Johan Galtung, peacekeeping practice and crisis 
management are the promotion of negative peace, or the absence of physical violence9. The 
second approach says that peacekeeping is related to the repressive mechanisms through 
which states protect their interests at an international level10.
Nevertheless, during the 90s after finalization of the Cold War, the situation on the 
world scene changed. The number of international wars considerably diminished; on the 
contrary, the number of national conflicts increased11. After the Cold War, the role of the UN 
as the main entity in the international community became more prominent. The UN was 
willing to promote peace in those areas where instability and violence were brought during 
the Cold War. In this international framework, UN Peacekeeping became a conflict stabiliser 
in the world conflicts that intervenes as a third party and promotes transformative policies. 
Consequently, the UN has been related to the problem solving model of intervention and to 
the conflict resolution field of knowledge. Martin defines the objective of peacekeeping as 
follows: 'Peacekeeping within the problem solving paradigm addresses the peaceful 
transformation o f conflict through societal accountability o f power holders (processes o f
8 Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (1996) in Martin A. Sola, The Contribution of Critical Theory to New Thinking 
on Peacekeeping, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Department of Peace Studies July 2005, p. 7, accessed at 
http://www.brad.ac.uk/acadyconfres/papers/pdfs/CCR15.pdf. 05/05
9 Galtung (1976) in Martin A. Sola, The Contribution of Critical Theory to New Thinking on Peacekeeping, 
Centre for Conflict Resolution, Department of Peace Studies July 2005, p. 7, accessed at 
http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/confres/papers/pdfs/CCR15.pdf. 05/05
10 Burton (1990) in in Martin A. Sola, The Contribution of Critical Theory to New Thinking on Peacekeeping, 
Centre for Conflict Resolution, Department of Peace Studies July 2005, p. 7, accessed at 
http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/confres/papers/pdfs/CCR15.pdf. 05/05
11 UN. UN at a glance : http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/index.shtml (accessed 5/3 2010)
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démocratisation, self-determination, human rights monitoring, truth commissions) and 
reconciliation o f divided communities. 'I2
Later, new global menaces emerged with the terrorist attacks on the United States on 
September 11, 2001 and new civil wars raised numerous questions and concerns. Despite 
criticism of the organisation and its failures in some missions, the experience from recent 
years have proved its capacity in the terms of peace building and peacekeeping, i.e. the 
structures contributing to the peace: economic development, social justice, human rights 
respect, good governance and support of democracy13. Overall, the United Nations is still 
considered 'the indispensable global organization for a globalizing world'14to promote these 
values. According to M. Pugh, after the Cold War, critical theory portrayed peace operations 
as essential to the ideology of 'liberal peace'. He also claims, there is a general gap in 
peacekeeping studies, he says that conflict management, more specifically peacekeeping has 
not been connected with a theory of knowledge yet. He supposes that because of the 
peacekeeping's hybridity in IR theory, it might be connected with exceptionalism and 
marginalization15.
The thesis will deal with the question of a necessity of a partnership and coherence 
among national and international actors. The study will come from analyzing of important 
steps that have taken place in the last years at both the political and institutional level and 
which have had significant influence on the EU-UN relations development. They are viewed
12 Martin A. Sola, The Contribution of Critical Theory to New Thinking on Peacekeeping, Centre for Conflict 
Resolution, Department of Peace Studies July 2005, p. 7, accessed at 
http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/confres/papers/pdfs/CCRl5.pdf. 05/05
13 UN. UN at a glance : http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/index.shtml (accessed 5/3 2010)
14 Government of Canada. Permanent mission of Canada to the United Nations:
http://www.canadaintemational.gc.ca/prmnv-mponu/canada un-canada onu/index.aspx (accessed 4/3 2010)
15 Michael Pugh, Peacekeeping and IR theory: Phantom of the Opera, University o f Plymouth, published in 
International Peacekeeping, Volume 10, Issue 3 December 2003, pages 104-112
12
from the EU perspective whose role has been gradually rising and whose role has also 
strengthened within the UN. Next, prospects for operational level cooperation and concerns 
connected are discussed. These are especially concerns coming from the EU's commitment to 
the United Nations. Also, importantly, scenarios providing models for the UN trend of 
involving the EU in the operations where force is used are presented. The concentration is 
devoted to the steps taken to make the EU-UN conflict management more efficient and 
generally develop capabilities of the collaboration in conflict management main hypothesis 
being as follows: In the world conflicts the European Union is a competent partner for the 
UN in the field o f crisis management in spite o f different agendas, policies and vocations. 
After, cooperation of the EU and the UN is watched more closely in operations Artemis and 
EUFOR RD Congo in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and analysis of successes and 
failures is provided.
To prove the hypothesis, qualitative analysis and a case study method will be used. 
Qualitative analysis shall evaluate whether the particular cooperation between the EU and the 
UN has been successful enough and whether the EU was and still is a competent partner for 
the UN. A case study will examine the operations Artemis and EUFOR RD Congo in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo as both are ones of the first missions deployed under the 
cooperation of the EU and the UN. They also follow the process of building the partnership 
between the two actors, growing political influence of the EU within the UN structures and 
the EU's strengthened capacities for conflict management and scenarios for possible 
cooperation. Furthermore, EUFOR RD Congo is a precedent for the cooperation of the EU 
and the UN. The study shall show the advantages gained from strengthened partnership where 
the EU shall prove itself as a competent actor.
First, it is necessary to explain the basis of the EU and the UN relations which starts
with the legal basis of their relationship and continues with the question of the partnership
13
balance. After, the development of the relations is treated from the European point of view 
and its strengthening role within the UN structure. Next, case study will research EU-UN 
cooperation on the operations EUFOR RD Congo and Artemis. The difference comes from 
the fact that Artemis was an emergency force, deployed to hold ground, protect civilians in 
the eastern DRC. On the contrary, EUFOR RD Congo was a deterrent force to provide extra 
power for pre-positioned UN forces in and around Kinshasa.16. Qualitative analysis will be led 
according to two sets of criteria. Considering the first set of criteria, I will come from the case 
study of Darya Pushkina in which she determines the reasons for successes and failures of 
certain missions. The second set of criteria comes from practical steps of the EU and UN 
which they have taken in recent years in order to formalize their relationship.
As for the criteria by Darya Pushkina, she claims that conflict management, more 
specifically peacekeeping, is considered being '... one o f the most important tools at the 
disposal o f the international community fo r  dealing with the violent conflicts characteristic o f  
the post-cold war period'17-, nevertheless, not all the operations have had a positive result, 
some missions being more successful than the others. First, Pushkina poses the question how 
success can be determined and how the UN's performance might be assessed18, then she 
claims fulfilment of the mandate is not enough as numerous scholars state 'the need for  
qualitative criteria and the contribution o f peacekeeping to larger values such as world
16 SDA Discussion Paper. The EU's Africa Strategy: What are the lessons of the Congo Mission? Accessed at 
http://www.cic.nvu.edu/intemationalsecuritY/globalpeace/PDFs/EU%27sAfricaStrategvDiscussionRGcontributio 
n richard.pdf. (25/05)
l7Pushkina D. (2006): A Recipe for Success? Ingredients of a Successful Peacekeeping Mission. International 
Peacekeeping, Vol.13, No.2, June 2006, pp.133-149
18 Paul Diehl, International Peacekeeping, Baltimore MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993; William 
Dixon, ‘Third-Party Techniques for Preventing Conflict Escalation and Promoting Peaceful Settlement’, 
International Organization, Vol.50, No.4, 1996, pp.653-81; Duane Bratt, ‘Peace Over Justice: Developing a 
Framework for Peacekeeping Operations in Internal Conflicts’, Global Governance, Vol.5, No.l, 1999, pp.63-78 
in Pushkina D. (2006): A Recipe for Success? Ingredients of a Successful Peacekeeping Mission, International 
Peacekeeping, Vol.13, No.2, June 2006, pp.133-149
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peace, justice, and the reduction o f human suffering'19. According to Bratt, peace is connected
to ‘the number o f lives that have been saved from likely death ’20 and the improvement of
political, economic, and social justice by ‘defending human rights, establishing the rule o f
law, and fostering economic and social cooperation’. Still, Anthony Lake claims that the
r2\
political success of the mission is also crucial to overall success' .
The criteria are set as follows:
'Criterion 1: Limiting violent conflict in the host state is the primary goal o f 
peacekeeping. Since peacekeepers are often deployed after a ceasefire agreement is in place, 
the peacekeepers ’ task is often to maintain that peace. This is a particularly challenging task 
in intrastate conflicts where various military factions may continue fighting despite any 
general ceasefire and where international borders that might separate warring parties are 
absent. This criterion is applied by analysing whether a mission succeeded in curbing large- 
scale violence, sustaining ceasefire agreements, reducing the number o f conflict related 
casualties and supervising demobilization, and by assessing the progress o f disarmament.
Criterion 2: Reduction o f human suffering is another primary goal o f peacekeeping 
missions. The UN is supposed to prevent atrocities against civilian populations, and 
peacekeeping missions are a major instrument towards achieving this goal. This criterion is
19 Daniel Druckman and Paul Stem, ‘Evaluating Peacekeeping Missions’, Mershon International Studies 
Review, Vol.41, No.l, 1997, p .152 in Pushkina D. (2006): A Recipe for Success? Ingredients of a Successful 
Peacekeeping Mission, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 13, No.2, June 2006, pp. 133-149
20 Paul Diehl, International Peacekeeping, Baltimore MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993; William 
Dixon, ‘Third-Party Techniques for Preventing Conflict Escalation and Promoting Peaceful Settlement’, 
International Organization, Vol.50, No.4, 1996, pp.653-81; Duane Bratt, ‘Peace Over Justice: Developing a 
Framework for Peacekeeping Operations in Internal Conflicts’,
Global Governance, Vol.5, N o.l, 1999, pp.65-66 in Pushkina D. (2006): A Recipe for Success? Ingredients of a 
Successful Peacekeeping Mission, International Peacekeeping, Vol.13, No.2, June 2006, pp.133-149
21 Anthony Lake, ‘Peacekeeping: Defining Success’, Peace Colloquy, N o.l, 2002, pp.8-9, accessed at 
www.nd.edu/ _krocinst/colloquy/issuel/feature_lake.html in Pushkina D. (2006): A Recipe for Success? 
Ingredients of a Successful Peacekeeping Mission, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 13, No.2, June 2006, 
pp.133-149
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operationalized by estimating the extent o f any reduction in human rights abuses and the 
mission's success in resettling refugees.
Criterion 3: Preventing the spread o f conflict beyond the object state's borders is also 
important fo r ensuring regional security. An internal conflict can spread to other countries in 
the region by the process known as ‘contagion’. Violence against civilians often creates 
refugee flows, and diaspora populations can cause competition for resources, provoking 
further conflict in neighbouring countries. To evaluate this criterion, the study assesses the 
extent to which the integrity o f neighbouring countries has been kept intact.
Criterion 4: Promoting conflict resolution is a final measure o f the effectiveness o f  the 
UN mission. For peacekeeping, it requires the creation o f a stable environment that is 
capable o f preventing the recurrence o f hostilities after the peacekeeping mission withdraws. 
This criterion will thus be assessed according to the extent to which the environment fostered
r22by peacekeepers inhibits future violence' .
The second set of criteria conies from practical steps of the EU and the UN which they 
have taken in recent years in order to formalize their relationship. Basically, it can be 
summarized there have been certain points that were important for advanced communication 
and understanding. Two objectives from the period of the Swedish EU Presidency from the 
first half of 2001 were '...(1) to develop mutually reinforcing approaches to conflict 
prevention and (2) to ensure that the E U ’s evolving military and civilian capacities would 
provide real added value for UN crisis management,23 . The conclusions from the European 
Goteborg European Summit launched strengthened contacts between the two institutions and 
in June 2001 a platform for intensified cooperation was agreed. It comprised of four levels:
22 Pushkina D. (2006): A Recipe for Success? Ingredients of a Successful Peacekeeping Mission, International 
Peacekeeping, Vol.13, No.2, June 2006, pp.133-149
23 General Affairs Council: EU-UN Co-operation in conflict prevention and crisis management, Conclusions 
2001): accessed at http://www.bits.de/CESD-PA/EU-UN%20cooperation.htm (20/05)
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Firstly, 'EU Ministerial meetings, where appropriate in Troika format, with the UN 
Secretary-General'; secondly, 'Meetings and contacts between the EU High Representative 
and European Commission External Relations Commissioner with the UN Secretary-General 
and UN Deputy Secretary-General'; thirdly, 'Security Committee meetings, where 
appropriate in Troika format, with the UN Deputy Secretary-General and Under Secretaries- 
General; and other levels and formats as appropriate'', fourthly, 'Contacts o f the Council 
Secretariat and the Commission services with the UN Secretariat at the appropriate levels \ 24
The procedures had the influence on the official level as well as on the working one 
when regular information exchange was started between the two secretariats. UNDPKO was 
identified as a UN partner and the EU Policy Unit identified the Office of the Assistant 
Secretary-General for Europe in UNDPA as its partner and regular exchange of information 
was settled between the EU Police Unit and the UN Police Division mainly in the period of 
transition from the UN Mission in Bosnia-Hezegovina (UNMIBFI) to the EU Police Mission 
(EUPM)25.
Consequently, the criteria will be determined as usual criteria for assessment of 
cooperation used for multilateral military operations. They can be denominated as the criteria 
of internal effectiveness which means the cooperation between the EU and the UN itself and 
general operational parameters. They should provide assessment of EU-UN cooperation in 
practice, determine successes and failures; first, political decision-making and planning 
process before and in the course of the operation; second, cooperation in the field; and third, 
support and logistics.
24 General Affairs Council: EU-UN Co-operation in conflict prevention and crisis management, Conclusions 
2001): accessed at http://www.bits.de/CESD-PA/EU-UN%20cooperation.htm (20/05)
25 Vainio L. (2008): Policing Missions: 'The Case of EUPM', European Security Review
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A case study will provide evaluation of the two operations. Each operation will include the 
background of the mission where general set of the operation will be explained. Second, the 
objectives of the mission will be provided as it is essential for final consideration of successes 
or failures of the mission. Third, first set of criteria will be considered according to provided 
scheme which will show external effectiveness as well as internal effectiveness of the 
mission. After setting the criteria, analysis of each operation as well as general evaluation will 
follow. Last but not least significance of EU-UN partnership will be explained. For the first 
part of my thesis, I will come from mainly official websites of the organisations which 
provide information about all necessary policies, resolutions, communications etc. (europa.eu, 
un.org); the second part of the research is based on the research of literature on crisis 
management (Thardy), peacekeeping (Martin, Pugh, Pushkina), UN-EU cooperation and 
coordination (Farrell) and the research on particular missions (Major, Nzongola-Ntalaja).
2 EU-UN cooperation
The United Nations could not be efficient without effective multilateralism and 
participation of other institutions and regional organizations in responding to the global 
challenges, threats and crises to maintain the world values and rule. The UN is considered to 
have the most multilateral relations, competence, and impartiality and coordination ability to 
reach such objectives26. In recent years, it is the European Union which has been mainly 
contributing to the UN conflict and crisis management as well as to numerous peacekeeping 
missions at the time when the organisation needs to face the crises and at the time when it
26 The European Union and the United Nations: Choice of Multilateralism
http://europa.eu/legislation summaries/foreign and security policy/cfsp and esdp implementation/r00009 en. 
htm (20/04)
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seeks support of other world players to carry out the missions so that a chance to succeed in 
these difficult tasks would be higher. On the other hand, the cooperation with the United 
Nations is also beneficial for the EU as it can be said it is seeking cooperation of the UN as a 
recognized and moral authority in international relations . According to R. Keohane, 
multilateralism has two different definitions, 'the definition that is more consistent with
ordinary usage conceives o f multilateralism as institutionalized collective action by an
'28inclusively determined set o f independent states.' He also claims that definition of 
multilateralism is provided in institutional terms. The second definition is provided by John 
Ruggie who states that 'multilateralism is limited to action among three or more states, on the 
basis o f generalized principles o f conduct, such as reciprocity '29. According to Keohane, such 
definition is meaningful for transformations studies in world politics.
As for the European Union, it started to develop its capabilities in both terms, military 
and civilian. The character of its crisis management helped the EU to be considered as a 
credible organisation promoting peace in international relations. After the World War II 
Europe needed to strengthen its military capabilities and started to focus more on civilian 
missions. Europe transformed its military doctrine to be able to respond in a civilian way30. At 
the time, Europe had to face numerous challenges, such as economic revitalization, war 
criminals, population resettlement, overall reconstruction, rule of law reestablishment31.
27 Major, C.: EU-UN Cooperation in Military Crisis Management: the experience of EUFOR RD Congo in 2006, 
p. 5
28 Pugh M. (2003): 'Peacekeeping and IR theory: Phantom of the Opera', University of Plymouth, published in 
International Peacekeeping, Volume 10, Issue 3 December 2003, pages 104-112
29 Pugh M. (2003): 'Peacekeeping and IR theory: Phantom of the Opera', University of Plymouth, published in 
International Peacekeeping, Volume 10, Issue 3 December 2003, pages 104-112
30 Weiss, Thmoas W. (1999): 'Military-Civilian Interactions Intervening In Humanitarian Crises. New York: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., p. 16
31 Weiss, Thmoas W. (1999): 'Military-Civilian Interactions Intervening In Humanitarian Crises. New York: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., p. 16
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Consequently, there were general demands in contemporary conflicts which were connected 
with new international stability demands requiring other missions, such as humanitarian and 
political32. These suggestions were not really included in conflict resolutions earlier than in 
the 1990s, which was the period right after unsuccessful missions in the failed states. The 
conflicts were mostly of ethno-political character and needed a comprehensive solution which 
was not provided. It is presumed to have an outstanding opportunity to contribute 
significantly to crisis management operations as it disposes a high variety of instruments, such 
as political tools like conflict mediation, economic tools such as humanitarian aid, economic 
assistance, rule of law, police and military operations. Nevertheless, there are still challenges 
for the EU to use these instruments in an effective way. It can be said that the ESDP has been 
significantly developing recently and such development has contributed to the EU's 
strengthened role in the world; it can be said that the evolution of ESDP was influenced by the 
relations with the UN and has had a convergent trend with the UN structures '... as a 
recognised moral and legal authority in international relations '33. Nevertheless, coordination 
within the EU structure also seems to be very difficult. Coherent approaches within the 
structure are necessary at all levels, the decision-making and the implementation ones mainly. 
Consequently, the political will as well as the structures for coordination are desirable. Also, 
in spite of common goals and interests, there are differences in the agendas and policies in 
terms of crisis management and sometimes there is a clash between what the EU offer and the 
UN demand34. Subsequently, the cooperation is aggravated by certain constraints.
32 Weiss, Thmoas W. (1999): 'Military-Civilian Interactions Intervening In Humanitarian Crises. New York: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., p. 18
33 Major, C. (2008): 'EU-UN Cooperation in Military Crisis Management: the experience of EUFOR RD Congo 
in 2006', p. 5
34 A Commissioned Paper by Dr Thierry Tardy, Director, European Training Course, Geneva Centre for Security 
Policy, for the International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations 2008 hosted by Ministry of Foreign 
and European Affairs and the Ministry of Defence in cooperation with CERI Science Po. The overall topic of the
20
2.1 Legal basis
The relations with the UN were established in the Treaty of Rome, originally for the European 
Community. It is the Article 302 of the Treaty on European Union from 1993 that declares 
that '... the European Commission is to ensure the maintenance o f all appropriate relations
o c
with the UN organs and its specialized agencies...' in the case of EC competence. In the 
case of mixed competence, it is the Commission and the presidency that represent the EC and 
the Commission which examines the ways of possible EU contribution to the efficient 
governance of the international society concerning the important global issues.
Support of multilateralism is a basic principle of the EU's foreign policy since a great 
number of global problems cannot be solved without international cooperation and 
commitment to multilateral cooperation and consequently, cooperation with the United 
Nations is one of the conditions for good functioning of the European Union within the 
international system36. The European Union cooperates with the United Nations in various 
issues of global importance, i.e. human rights, the fight against terrorism, the fight against 
organised crime and drug trafficking, crisis management and peacekeeping. The European 
Union agreed to support the effective multilateral legal instruments, from the most important 
ones such as the Kyoto protocol or the International criminal court in recent years. Support of 
new initiatives is an indispensable contribution to the coherence promotion and the right
forum is “Partnership - The United Nations, the European Union and the Regional Dimensions of Peace 
Operations: Examples of Cooperation within the framework of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter”. P. 1
35 European Union&United Nations: Partnership in Action: http://www.europa-eu- 
un.org/articles/en/article 458 en.htm (05/04)
36 Summaries of EU legislation: The European Union and the United Nations: The choice of multilateralism, 
accessed at
http://europa.eu/legislation summaries/foreign and security policv/cfsp and esdp implementation/r00009 en. 
htm (0504)
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balance between the institutions on a global scale, not only the UN, but other organisations
' i n
and structures, for instance the Bretton Woods system, World Bank or IMF .
The fastest possible ratification of the UN instruments in all member states and the 
final implementation in practice is a good example of EU multilateral initiatives for which an 
agreement on common positions in all member states is crucial. More specifically, all EU 
member states are also members of the United Nations and each of them has one vote in the 
General Assembly38 and there is a wide variety of issues that need to be addressed on the 
global level and it is indispensable the EU would respond in one voice. Numerous agreements 
have been signed between the EU and its neighbouring countries so these countries which 
consequently contribute to the influence of the EU in the General Assembly.
Article J.2 of the Maastricht Treaty declared: ‘The diplomatic and consular missions o f the 
Member States and the Commission Delegations in third countries and international 
conferences, and then representations to international organizations, shall cooperate in 
ensuring that the common positions and common measures adopted by the Council are 
complied with and implemented.,39 Nevertheless, there is a clash between the UN Security 
Council and the Article 19, 2 of the Treaty on European Union as in the Security Council, the 
most powerful organ within the UN structure, there are two EU member states holding 
permanent status, i.e. France and the UK but the EU Article declares to coordinate actions of 
the EU. ... 'member states represented in international organisations or international 
conferences where not all the member states participate shall keep the latter informed o f any
37 European Union&United Nations: Partnership in Action: http://www.europa-eu- 
un.org/articles/en/article 458 en.htm (05/04)
38 European Union&United Nations: Partnership in Action: http://www.europa-eu- 
un.org/articles/en/article 458 en.htm (05/04)
39 Maastricht treaty (1992): accessed at http://www.eurotreaties.com/maastrichtec.pdf (05/04)
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matter o f common interest. Member states which are also members o f the United Nations 
Security Council will concert and keep the other member states fully informed. Member states 
which are permanent members o f the Security Council will, in the execution o f their functions, 
ensure the defence o f the positions and the interests o f the Union, without prejudice to their 
responsibilities under the provisions o f the UN Charter. '4
In the communication treating the question of multilateralism from 2003 the EU 
strives to fulfil its potential as a central pillar of the UN system where the importance of 
enhancing co-operation with the UN is highlighted and the EU's voice in the UN 
strengthened41. Nevertheless, naturally, there are differences on multilateralism between the 
EU and the UN. The common positions are in the issues concerning the protection of human 
rights, security which is under the international law being the issue of the most frequent 
cooperation between the EU and EU non-members. On the other hand, the issue of state 
sovereignty differs between the EU and the UN. The EU keeps the right to intervene in case 
of endangered human security, the UN Charter, on the contrary, is against the use of force 
except the case of self-defence42.
This Communication has set out from two basic premises. First, that a commitment to 
multilateralism is more essential than ever and therefore must remain a central strand o f the 
EU's external action. Second, that the role o f the United Nations as the backbone o f the 
multilateral system, and the need to make it deliver concrete solutions to many key global 
challenges, are beyond doubt. On that basis, the Communication has sought to take a wide-
40 Maastricht treaty (1992): accessed at http://www.eurotreaties.com/maastrichtec.pdf (05/04)
41 EUR-LEX: Access to European Law: accessed at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!DocNumber&type_doc=COMfinal&an doc=2003 
&nu_doc=526&lg=en, accessed 29/03
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ranging look at the way in which the EU works in, and with, the UN, with a view to 
determining whether, and how, its effectiveness in helping the UN deliver effective global 
governance can be improved, especially in the fields o f sustainable development, poverty 
reduction, security and peace. One basic conclusion in that regard is positive: interaction and 
co-operation with the organisations o f  the UN system is already present at unprecedented 
levels across a wide range o f areas. At the same time, the EU could be more effective in its 
contribution to shaping policy within the UN; and both the EU and the UN stand to gain from  
further improvements and greater synergy in their operational co-operation.
A series ofpractical proposals are put forward in the Communication as to how the EU might 
make a more effective contribution to global governance with the UN. Only some o f these are 
within the exclusive responsibility o f the Commission - many would require action from the 
Council and Member States; and in many cases, a concerted effort by several institutions and 
at different levels is needed. To clarify the implications and respective roles o f different actors 
in the process o f implementation, an action plan for implementation o f the Communication is 
annexed to the text.
The Commission invites the Council and Parliament to consider the analysis and the 
Recommendations put forward in this Communication; and looks forward to working closely 
with the Member States and with the United Nations to advance the shared objective o f more 
effective global governance and strengthening the architecture o f the multilateral system.43 '
The regular meetings take place at ministerial level in New York every year and the 
UN Deputy Secretary-General and other UN officials visit EU institutions in Brussels,
43 EUR-LEX: Access to European Law: accessed at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi ! celexplus !prod! DocNumber&type_doc=COMfinal&an doc=2003 
&nu_doc=526&lg=en, accessed 29/03
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Luxembourg and Strasbourg44. It is the UN Secretary-General, Deputy Secretary-General and 
the European Parliament that deal with the coordination of the policies between the UN and 
the EU. The common positions of the European Union are presented to the UN by the 
presidency. Nevertheless national interests of the particular presidency can also play a certain 
role45. Most of the EU statements are made to the Security Council and the General Assembly 
and most of all they concern peace and security issues, then economic and social development 
and human rights. It has to be noted that there is no common policy and supranationality. 
Generally, the UN and the EU agree on the necessity of strengthening of the Council working 
groups dealing with the UN issues. Other EU representatives should have more opportunities 
to promote the EU common positions in the UN, based on mandates and guidelines, the 
relevant Council bodies reinforced considering monitoring and adequate preparation of the 
implementation of agreed policies. Both, the EU and the UN intend to include third countries 
in their activities in order to share burden among the Member States, the Commission and the 
Presidency. The Political and Security Committee ensures the cohesion between the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy and the European Union in the United Nations46.
Furthermore, the Treaty of Lisbon established the position of High Representative for 
the common foreign and security policy in order to strengthen the role of the European Union 
on the international stage and establish a functioning EU common foreign and security policy. 
HR is the key position as his/her responsibilities are to help by making proposals and in 
institutional terms, the position is involved in both the Council and the European Commission
^European Union@United Nations: Partnership in Action: accessed at http://www.europa-eu- 
un.org/articles/articleslist_s33_en.htm, (29/03)
45Farrell, M.(2006): EU Representation and Coordination within the United Nations, Centre d'Etudes et de 
Recherches Internationales, p. 9
46 Farrell, M.(2006): EU Representation and Coordination within the United Nations, Centre d'Etudes et de 
Recherches Internationales, p. 8
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policies. High Representative has then special responsibility for coherent external action on 
the part of the EU. A new European External Action Service (EEAS) is created to support the 
actions47.
Cooperation of the EU and the UN has been seen numerous times in practice as the 
EU has cooperated with the UN in numerous peacekeeping and peace building missions, such 
as Afghanistan (UNAMA, UNDP), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo (UNMiK), Democratic 
Republic of Congo. The high level of EU engagement in security issues within the UN proves 
the capacity of significant contribution to the international security and its capacity to play an 
important role in international security . It is necessary the process of consensus building 
between the EU members and the UN structure would be coherent. The decisions concerning 
EU civilian crisis management operations are taken by the Commission; fast decision making 
process has been strengthened by The Rapid Reaction Mechanism49. Regular meetings at the 
level between the UN and the European Union were introduced between the General 
Secretary-General and the UN Deputy Secretary General as well as between the Council and 
the Commission. Concerning conflict crisis management as well as post-crisis situations, the 
European Union and the United Nations bound themselves to cooperate with regional 
organisations. The Commission encourages to concentration on specific geographical areas 
and direct cooperation between the crisis regions in the UN, such as the Department of 
Political Affairs, the Department of Peace Keeping Operations, the Office for the Co­
ordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the Commission. It is the UN which takes care of the
47 European Integration Working Group : The European External Action Service: accessed at 
http://librarv.fes.de/pdf-files/id/ipa/06326.pdf (20/04)
48 Tardy T. (2008): 'United Nations -  European Relations in Crisis Management', International Forum for the 
Challenges of Peace Operations
49 Farrell, M.(2006): EU Representation and Coordination within the United Nations, Centre d'Etudes et de 
Recherches Internationales, p. 6
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training of the personnel from both organisations for crisis management operations and both 
organisations strive to achieve the most possible coherence within the structure50.
To conclude, attitude of multilateralism is the principle of the EU foreign policy as 
well as a commitment to strengthen closer relations with the UN. The EU strives persuade the 
states to follow the principles of multilateralism, to follow the rules of international 
organisations in order to improve the situation of the global governance. The EU's 
commitment to multilateralism as well as to the United Nations will show if the structure set 
after World War II will successfully fulfil its objectives in development of international peace 
and security which means to help countries follow the set of rules, promote multilateralism in 
all spectra against national interests. Both the European Union and the United Nations share 
the same values, i.e. the protection of human rights, the respect for international law, 
democracy. Nevertheless, there are some restriction in the EU-UN cooperation within the 
multilateral system, such as supranational tendencies of particular member states which 
causing difficulties to the whole system51.
2.2 The question o f equal partnership
The United Nations and the European Union have invested much effort in order to 
improve their relationship and bring it to a very official level. It is important to focus on 
important steps that have taken place in the recent years at both the political and institutional 
levels which have had significant influence on the EU-UN relations development . These
50 Farrell, M.(2006): EU Representation and Coordination within the United Nations, Centre d'Etudes et de 
Recherches Internationales, p. 6
51 The UN, the EU, NATO and Other Regional Actors: Partners in Peace?, IPA, 11-12 0ctober2002, p. 1. in 
relation to that opinion, at the end of the 1990s, NATO’s Summit in Washington decided that NATO would have 
no geographical limits (New Strategic Concept, April 1999)
52 Jakobsen V. P. (2006): EU-UN Cooperation in Civilian Crisis Management : A Promising Work in Progress, 
p . l
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steps have also been important from the point of view of an increasing role the EU has played 
within the UN structures as they have made the EU-UN crisis management more efficient and 
that have generally developed capabilities of the collaboration in crisis management. 
Recently, the EU has been developing its capacity in terms of crisis management and has put 
the issue on the top of the agenda in the relations with the United Nations. The relations were 
specified in a Joint Declaration on EU-UN cooperation in crisis management from September 
2003.
At the same time, despite the fact the progress is limited by the Security Council, the 
EU managed to gain more political influence within the UN structure. It can be said the 
relations between the UN and the EU are settled on decision-making basis where there is no , 
overall right to deal with the issues of the international character, i.e. peace and security . 
This is the reason why the EU, more specifically the European Security and Defence Policy, 
extended options for cooperation with other structures. According to Esther Brimmer, '... 
what makes the EU a potentially significant contributor to international security is the ability 
to combine civilian and military resources to manage violent conflicts. The EU presents itself 
as able to combine traditional ‘hard’ military power with non-traditional ‘soft’ power'.54
Overall, as the largest contributor of UN peacekeeping, the European Union 
cooperates with the United Nations considerably, supporting the UN Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations and implementing recommendations from the Brahimi Report55. 
The structure of EU-UN has gone through significant decision-making development where
53 The UN, the EU, NATO and Other Regional Actors: Partners in Peace?, IPA, 11-12 0ctober2002, p. 1. in 
relation to that opinion, at the end of the 1990s, NATO’s Summit in Washington decided that NATO would have 
no geographical limits (New Strategic Concept, April 1999)
54 Esther Brimmer, The EU’s Search for a Strategic Role -  ESDP and Its Implications for Transatlantic 
Relations, Washington, D.C.: SAIS Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2002, pp. 102-103
55 UN Peace Operations and the 'Brahimi Report', by William J. Durch, the Henry L. Stimson Center, October 
2001
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international peace and security issues are treated on the multilateral level and no state or 
institution has privileged rights. In fact, the European Security and Defence Policy newly 
enabled cooperation of the UN with a regional organisation and the EU shall prove if it is a 
capable contributor to the international security and crisis management. Both organisations 
had to fulfil certain criteria before they could start to cooperate in the field of crisis 
management. These criteria had both legal and operational character; nevertheless, the EU 
had to make more significant effort as it was founded more recently56. At first, the relations 
were rather on a symbolic level, a serious cooperation started at the beginning of 2003 with 
one of the first tests in the EU-UN cooperation in the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (EUPM) where the EU later overtook responsibility over the mission. Inter- 
institutional cooperation of the two actors was assured already in the planning phase and after 
launching of the operation regular exchange of information was provided through liaison 
officers. The first report said that ‘ while the EUPM is the first experience o f cooperation in 
the field between the UN and E U ’, it illustrates that a smooth and efficient transition o f 
responsibility from the UN to EU in a crisis management operation is no longer an aspiration 
but a concrete component o f our cooperation. ’57, which proves certain success of the 
cooperation, considering the fact it was just the beginning of collaboration between the two 
structures. Close cooperation and coordination were necessary for both a strategic part of the 
operation and for the actions in the field. Nonetheless, there was a tension coming from the 
EU side as its takeover of the mission that had already existed caused some problems in its 
reshaping to the necessities of the organisation. The High Representative for CFSP issued 
reports on the activities of EUPM and kept sending them to the UN Security Council once in
56 Esther Brimmer (ed.), The EU’s Search for a Strategic Role -  ESDP and Its Implications for Transatlantic 
Relations, Washington, D.C.: SAIS Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2002, pp. 102-103.
57 Novosselof A (2004): 'EU-UN Partnership in Crisis Management', Developments and Prospects,
International Peace Academy, p. 14
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six months. At the same time the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
CO
and UNHCR (the UN Refugee agency) were founded .
Other experience was gained in the Artemis Operation in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo in 2003 which was the first operation for the EU outside its territory under the mandate 
of the UN. The operation was important for strengthening coordination and cooperation in 
communication, planning and training and, afterwards, the Joint Declaration on UN-EU 
Coordination in Crisis Management was signed in 2003. The crisis management became a 
real priority in the EU-UN relations59. The GAERC statement from the meeting called on 'the 
Presidency, assisted by the Council Secretariat and in fu ll association with the Commission, 
to take forward the necessary preparatory work to develop modalities for practical co­
operation with respect to the relevant options listed above, in close consultation with the UN 
and in view o f a possible agreement between the EU and the UN on crisis management within 
the ESDP'60. The European Commission presented on 10th September, 2003, a new strategy 
for EU-UN relations calling for 'improving the EU coordinating mechanisms in Brussels, 
New York and Vienna, establishing direct EC representation in fora that deal with issues o f 
Community competence, and establishing early contacts/co-operation between EU services 
and those o f UN agencies, including hands-on co-operation in the fie ld ”61. And even though 
Joint Declaration on EU-UN cooperation was treating covering both civilian and military 
aspects of crisis management was the Declaration, the European Council “reaffirmed the
58 UNHCR: accessed at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home (25/05)
59 General Affairs and External Relations Conclusions, 2522nd Council meeting, Brussels, 21 July 2003
60 European Union @ United Nations EU-UN -  “Commission calls for the EU to renew its commitment to the 
UN system and multilateralism”, EC03-247EN, European Commission, 10/9/2003
61 European Union @ United Nations EU-UN -  “Commission calls for the EU to renew its commitment to the 
UN system and multilateralism”EC03-247EN, European Commission, 10/9/2003.
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European Union’s commitment to help achieve United Nations objectives in crisis 
management '62.
Basically, it can be said there have been certain points that were important for 
advanced communication and understanding. Two objectives from the period of the Swedish 
EU Presidency from the first half of 2001 were '(.1) to develop mutually reinforcing 
approaches to conflict prevention and (2) to ensure that the E U ’s evolving military and 
civilian capacities would provide real added value for UN crisis management'63 . The 
conclusions from the European Goteborg European Summit launched the strengthened 
contacts between the two institutions and in June 2001 a platform for intensified cooperation 
was agreed. It comprised of four levels: Firstly, 'EU Ministerial meetings, where appropriate 
in Troika format, with the UN Secretary-General'', secondly, “Meetings and contacts between 
the EU High Representative and European Commission External Relations Commissioner 
with the UN Secretary- General and UN Deputy Secretary-General”', thirdly, Security 
Committee meetings, where appropriate in Troika format, with the UN Deputy Secretary- 
General and Under Secretaries-General; and other levels and formats as appropriate'', 
fourthly, 'Contacts o f the Council Secretariat and the Commission services with the UN 
Secretariat at the appropriate levels'.64
The procedures had the influence on the official level as well as on the working one 
when regular information exchange was started between the two secretariats. UNDPKO was 
identified as UN partner and the EU Policy Unit identified the Office of the Assistant
62 General Affairs and External Relations Conclusions, 2527th Council meeting, Brussels, 19 September 2003
63 Conclusions -  Items approved without debate, 2356th Council meeting, EU General Affairs Council, 
Luxembourg, 11-12 June 2001
64 EU General Affairs Council Conclusions, 2356th Council meeting, Luxembourg, 11-12 June 2001
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Secretary-General for Europe in UNDPA as its partner and regular exchange of information 
was settled between the EU Police Unit and the UN Police Division mainly in the period of 
transition from the UN Mission in Bosnia-Hezegovina (UNMIBH) to the EU Police Mission 
(EUPM).
In January 2003 both secretariats established task forces between the UNDPKO and 
the EU's DGE-IX. As a result, EU's departments connected with UN issues shall agree on all 
the actions, list them, identify them and strive for cooperation. UN Military Adviser General 
Patrick Cammaert said about UNDPKO that 'the ad hoc coordination group on UNDPKO- 
EU relations ... provides a forum for the exchange o f information on DP KO-EU relations, 
and an ideal vehicle for the crafting o f UNDPKO’s overall strategy vis-à-vis the EU. ... It will 
greatly facilitate both our external and internal communications, and will assist the process 
o f developing a systematized, comprehensive and integrated strategy to inform our 
interactions with the EU, and potentially other regional organizations'65. A special organ 
named Steering Committee was founded in order to meet twice a year and discuss common 
concerns, as well as assure regular meeting of liaison officers from both sides and to supervise 
reforming of particular areas of the cooperation that needed to be reformed, i.e. planning, 
training, communication and best practices66 Delegation to the UN was established already in 
1974 with an observer status. The Steering Committee has supervised keeping of all the points 
of the contract at all levels of the two secretariats and has participated on a significant
65 Address by the Major-General Patrick C. Cammaert, Military Adviser to the DPKO, “The Future Partnership 
with Regional Institutions: The Role of the United Nations in Conflict Management”, 3 July 2003, IPA Vienna 
Seminar.
66 The Peacekeeping Best Practices Section (PBPS) assists in the planning, conduct, management and support of 
peacekeeping operations by learning from experience, problem solving and transferring best practices in United 
Nations peacekeeping. To this end, the Section undertakes a broad range of activities and work, including: (i) 
knowledge management; (ii) policy analysis and development; and (iii) lessons learned. The overall goal is to 
develop and support a culture of best practices in United Nations peacekeeping by helping to establish and 
develop the mechanisms and working habits to share knowledge. Accessed 30/04 at 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/bestpractices.shtml
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evolution of the operational cooperation thanks to training of particular standards and 
modules and personnel training courses. Nevertheless, it has to be said the UN has often tried 
to have more influence on the EU and wanted it to get engaged in its operations more 
significantly than the EU was interested which was the reason of particular tension. However, 
the cooperation has been developing rather positively and it can also be evaluated as the most 
ideal between the UN and a regional organisation. Its function was strengthened after signing 
of Amsterdam Treaty because of Article 19 and the post of High Representative.67
2.3 Analysis ofgrowing political influence
Kofi Annan stated that 'experience has shown that the consolidation o f peace in the aftermath 
o f conflict requires more than purely diplomatic and military action ... integrated peace 
building effort is needed'68. It can be said that EU's role in crisis management has been 
strengthened recently, there are three factors that express strong involvement of the EU in 
crisis management, and these are presence, capability and opportunity. The point is that crisis 
management where the EU operates gained a leading role and became an actor on the world 
scene. We might understand EU's today's role from different points of views. First, according 
to Treacher, the EU got in the external policies by default69It can be also characterised by 
'spill-over' notion70. Basically, the EU is a representative of certain nations and subsequently,
67 European Union @ United Nations, http://www.europa-eu-un.org/article.asp?id=458&lg=5
68 Schnabel, A., Ehrhart, H. G. ed., (2004): 'Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding'. New 
York: United Nations University Press., p. 3
69 Treacher, A. (2004): 'From Civilian Power to Military Actor: The EU’s Resistible 
Transformation', European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 9, pp. 49-66.
70 Reichard, M. (2006): T he EU-NATO Relationship A Legal and Political Perspective',
Hampshire: Ashgate, 56
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certain form of hard power is necessary (Hill 1993, 7). 71Naturally, the reason is the Union 
wanted to spread its influence on the world scene, although, military capabilities were 
necessary for such development. It can be said crisis management (of civilian type) had 
developed without strong capability of the EU.
Treaty of the European Union described the EU's interest in defence and security: 
'project stability and lasting peace within and beyond its borders '72. Before, the fields such as 
defence and security were managed by the USA, NATO and the Western European Union as 
the military structures in Europe were not in a good shape for peacekeeping operations and
n ' i
the forces did not get out of Europe .and subsequently, the dependence on other institutions 
and organisations made Europe act more actively even incited by the conflicts in former 
Yugoslavia. The difficult situation proved the limited capacities of Europe very soon; the 
European Community was de-valued in the war in Bosnia.
It is necessary to analyse what political influence cooperation between the EU and the 
UN has had so far. Basically, European Security and Defence Policy was getting involved 
within the UN structure. Already at the Helsinki European Summit in 1999 and later at the 
Goteborg European Summit in 2001 'the primary responsibility o f the UN Security Council 
fo r the maintenance o f international peace and security”74 was determined and stronger 
cooperation between the two actors was established. The Europe Security Strategy confirmed 
that the United Nations Charter is ' a fundamental framework for international relation', and 
later recognized 'strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities
71 Hill, C. (1993): 'Capability-Expectation Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe’s International Role' Journal of 
Common Market Studies, Vol. 31, No.3, pp 306-328
72 Nowak. A., ed., (2006): 'Chaillot Paper Civilian Crisis Management: The EU way',
Institute for Security Studies, No. 90, p. 6
73 Howorth, J. (2007): 'Security Defence in the European Union', New York: Palgrave 
Macmillian, p. 95
74 UN Security Council: accessed at: http://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council.html (30/04)
and to act effectively, is a European priority'75. According to these conditions, the UN 
became both a legal and legitimate actor for the EU while operating outside Europe. 
Nevertheless, it must be considered what the EU influence in terms of European sates within 
the UN structure is. It can be claimed EU member states themselves are active in terms of 
improving the level of influence they have on the UN decision-making. In fact, their influence 
and steps they take influence the EU entity which is referred to in Article 19 of the Treaty of 
the European Union76. Article 19 revises both the UN and EU member state policy issues in 
terms of policies coordination but also coordination of EU policies in other organizations of 
various characters which the EU member states participate in. It can be also concluded that 
Article 19 strengthened the EU influence and position in international relations. Nonetheless, 
it can be said the EU did not gain its recognition very fast. EU member states keep taking part 
in the regional group WEOG (Western European and Other States)77 but sometimes EU has 
worked as an entity and deciding about the issues in common. This concerns first of all the 
decisions taken in the General Assembly as well as in its organs.78 EU Presidency referred to
75 UN Security Council: http://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council.html (30/04)
76 The provisions of Article 19 of the consolidated Treaty on European Union (which includes the 1997 
Amsterdam Treaty amendments) are the following: “ 1./ Member States shall coordinate their action in 
international organizations and at international conferences. They shall uphold the common positions in such 
fora. In international organizations and at international conferences where not all the Member States participate, 
those which do take part shall uphold the common positions. 2./ Without prejudice to paragraph 1 and Article 
14(3), Member States represented in international organizations or international conferences where not all the 
Member States participate shall keep the latter informed of any matter of common interest. Member States which 
are also members of the United Nations Security Council will concert and keep the other Member States fully 
informed. Member States which are permanent members of the Security Council will, in the execution of their 
functions, ensure the defence of the positions and the interests of the Union, without prejudice to their 
responsibilities under the provisions of the United Nations Charter.”
77 The WEOG is the most heteroclite UN regional group at the General Assembly, gathering the “rest of the 
world”: the North- American countries (Canada, United States), Oceania (Australia, New-Zealand), and all the 
Western European countries (Turkey included).
78 'EU Cohesion in the UN General Assembly', Occasional Papers, n° 49, December 2003, EU Institute for 
Security Studies
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these organs for all EU member states as well as for Central and Easter States not being EU
79member states and the time, EU candidates .
Important issues from crisis management, for instance Afghanistan or Africa, are 
discussed by the EU Presidency which gets involved in Security Council meetings. 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to coordinate decision-making process as the procedures are easier 
in the Security Council than in the General Assembly. Consequently, meetings in order to 
exchange information were established. Firstly, the same issues treated by the Security 
Council were treated. Later, new urgent issues were discussed and weekly meetings among 
Security Council coordinators started to be rather detailed. It has to be pointed out that 
stronger coherence between EU states might have had positive influence for the countries 
with permanent seat in the Security Council. There were claims that an EU seat in the 
Security Council might have been motivation for a common foreign policy at the time since 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy is not comparable with the special position of the 
countries, such as France and the UK. Other opinion were expressed that an EU permanent 
seat would have made sense as the EU should be considered as an entity with the common 
foreign policy in the Security Council as well. Such decision was supposed to deal with the 
problem of the extensive representation of Europe in the Security Council where France, the 
UK and Germany were supposed to have a permanent status and where Europe might have 
had five non-permanent seats. In fact, France and the UK were against the idea as they said 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy is not the only policy for Europe80.
79 'EU Cohesion in the UN General Assembly', Occasional Papers, n° 49, December 2003, EU Institute for 
Security Studies
80 Sur S. (1995) : Relations internationales, Paris, Monchrestien, p. 497
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2.4 Analysis o f capacities
The EU General Affairs Council came to the findings that crisis management became 
an essential issue for the EU-UN relations, which was even an incentive for the Balkans and 
the DRC 81. The GAC called on 'the Presidency, assisted by the Council Secretariat and in 
fu ll association with the Commission, to take forward the necessary preparatory work to 
develop modalities for practical co-operation with respect to the relevant options listed 
above, in close consultation with the UN and in view o f a possible agreement between the EU 
and the UN on crisis management within the ESDP'82. New strategy concerning EU-UN 
relations was launched in September 2003 initiating 'improving the EU coordinating 
mechanisms in Brussels, New York and Vienna, establishing direct EC representation in fora 
that deal with issues o f Community competence, and establishing early contacts/co-operation 
between EU services and those o f UN agencies, including hands non co-operation in the 
fie ld”83. The Joint Declaration on EU-UN cooperation treating crisis management was signed 
on 24th September 2003 which reaffirmed the European Union’s commitment to help 
achieve United Nations objectives in crisis management"^. After the operation Artemis in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo which was generally successful, it was the UK and France 
that proposed a new initiative for the EU to focus on the development of its rapid reaction
81 General Affairs and External Relations Conclusions, 2522nd Council meeting, Brussels, 21 July 2003, 
accessed at
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:8oBc8eKVUvoJ:www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/Ne 
wsWord/en/gena/76752.doc+General+Affairs+and+Extemal+Relations+Conclusions,+2522nd+Council+meetin 
g,+Brussels,+21 +July+2003&cd= 1 &hl=cs&ct=clnk&gl=cz (05/04)
83 General Affairs and External Relations Conclusions, 2527th Council meeting, Brussels, 19 September 2003, 
accessed at http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/03/stl2/stl2293.en03.pdf (05/04)
84 General Affairs and External Relations Conclusions, 2527th Council meeting, Brussels, 19 September 2003, 
accessed at http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdl7en/03/stl2/stl2293.en03.pdf (05/04)
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8Scapabilities to enhance its ability to help the UN in short-term crisis management situations' 
in 2003. As a consequence, the EU Council created the concept of coherent credible battle- 
groups which were composed of 1,500 men deployed as a rapid force86.
The UN welcomed the initiative of the EU to strengthen its capabilities in terms of 
deploying joint civil-military rapid force. These actions were started after establishing the 
European Security and Defence Policy. The first reason why the United Nations appreciated 
these initiatives was filling the gap in its peacekeeping and rapid reaction capacities which the 
UN was very well aware of, especially after the Srebrenica disaster that has had consequences 
on the UN military personnel provision. The western European states became reluctant in 
military deployment. Consequently, the UN did not consider the ESDP as a competition but 
as necessary complement; on the other hand, the UN would have appreciated more support 
from the EU side, especially in peacekeeping missions on African continent where the 
European deployment is considered unsatisfactory.87
Nevertheless, currently, the EU strives to strengthen its role in terms of peacekeeping 
capacities and financing, technically supporting the African Union and participating in UN 
operations establishment. It is not only the use of force that an essential element for crisis 
management it is also prevention including diplomacy and economic means as well as 
communication, managing peace, and reconstruction. When it is considered how conflicts 
should be addressed, there are numerous issues that must be taken in account, such as the 
character of the conflict, geography, possible spill over, capacity of aggressors, involvement
85 Jakobsen V. P. (2006): EU-UN Cooperation in Civilian Crisis Management: A Promising Work in Progress, 
p. 1
86 SDA Discussion Paper. The EU's Africa Strategy : What are the lessons of the Congo Mission? University of 
Brussels, Institute of European Studies, p. 21
87 SDA Discussion Paper. The EU's Africa Strategy : What are the lessons of the Congo Mission? University of 
Brussels, Institute of European Studies, p. 21
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of third parties in management and organizations involved in intervention. And then, when 
third parties intervene, there are numerous features where they can differ again: timing, 
objectives, interests and then coherence in alliance might experience difficulties. Obviously, it 
depends how much a conflict is important for different actors and then the level of their 
intervention will differ. Obviously, when a crisis is addressed, common positions from the 
third parties are expected. There are examples confirming that when third parties have 
different positions than the international community might not respond in the most 
appropriate way, for instance the case in the Balkans when the US had a different proposition 
than NATO neighbours, the US position was promoted and the European were not able to 
promote its influence.
The EU is very motivated about a strong and effective cooperation with the UN in 
Africa, proved by the ESDP Action Plan for Africa and its battle group, however, more 
coordination and coherence in all fields is still highly desirable. It can be said there exist 
different options treating the involvement of the EU within the UN structure concerning crisis 
management for both UN-led and UN-mandated operations, more specifically determined by 
three indicators: firstly, the level of EU assets' deployment in a given UN operation, secondly, 
the sense of such deployment and the character of the activity itself at the very beginning, and 
lastly, the cooperation comprised exchange of information and contacts on a very high level. 
First meeting was the EU Troika summit when the EU High Representative addressed the UN 
Security Council in 2000.88 The EU troika summit was followed by the Goteborg European 
Council one year later where a set of principles and practical options guiding EU-UN
88 SDA Discussion Paper. The EU's Africa Strategy : What are the lessons of the Congo Mission? University of 
Brussels, Institute of European Studies, p. 21
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cooperation concerning civilian crisis management was adopted. EU-UN dialogue was 
generally strengthened.89
Obviously, there exist differences between the approaches towards the conflict crisis 
management from the part of the UN and the EU but it is still the Security Council of the UN 
which is responsible for peace operations being the body possessing legalising and 
legitimising role for peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations90. Nonetheless, the UN is still 
unique in terms of possessing the right to give orders concerning the use of force in 
international relations. Accordingly, except the United States, the UN is the organisation with 
the highest level of peace operations. The UN has deployed almost 124,000 personnel on its 
16 peace operations under the umbrella of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations all 
over the world91.
Current DPKO-led peace missions
1948 MIDDLE EAST UNTSO — UN Truce Supervision Organization
1949 INDIA/PAKISTAN UNMOGIP — UN Military Observer Group in India and
Pakistan
1964 CYPRUS UNFICYP — UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
1974 SYRIA UNDOF — UN Disengagement Observer Force
1978 LEBANON UNIFIL— UN Interim Force in Lebanon
89 Jakobsen V. P. (2006): EU-UN Cooperation in Civilian Crisis Management : A Promising Work in Progress, 
p. 3
90 Fact Sheet: United Nations Peacekeeping: accessed at:
http://wwwupdate.un.org/en/events/peacekeepersdav/2010/factsheet.pdf ( 10/05)
91 Jakobsen V. P. (2006): EU-UN Cooperation in Civilian Crisis Management : A Promising Work in Progress, 
p . l
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1991 WESTERN SAHARA MINURSO — UN Mission for the Referendum in 
Western Sahara
1999 KOSOVO UNMIK — UN Interim Administration Mission in 
Kosovo
1999 DEMOCRATIC REP. OF MONUC—  UN Organization Mission in the Democratic
CONGO Republic of the Congo
2002 AFGHANISTAN UNAMA— UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
2003 LIBERIA UNMIL— UN Mission in Liberia
2004 CÔTE DD IVOIRE UNOCÏ — UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire
2004 HAITI MINUSTAH — UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti
2005 SUDAN UNMIS —  UN Mission in the Sudan
2006 TIMOR-LESTE UNMIT — UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste
2007 DARFUR (Sudan) UNAMID —AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur
2007 CENTRAL AFRICAN MINURCAT—  UN Mission in the Central African
REP./CHAD Republic and Chad
Besides the DPKO, it is the Department of Field Supports which is also involved in 
the field of personnel, budget, communications, information technology and logistics and
92provides another 12 missions under the umbrella of the Department of Political Affairs . 
Generally, concerning the military force the UN depends on the contributions from the 
member states. To the date February 28, 2010, 115 countries contributed its personnel to UN 
peacekeeping. More than 84,000 of those serving were troops and military observers and 
about 13,000 were police personnel. In addition, there were more than 5,800 international
92 Fact Sheet: United Nations Peacekeeping: accessed at:
http://wwwupdate.un.org/en/events/peacekeepersdav/2010/factsheet.pdf (10/05)
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civilian personnel, nearly 14,000 local civilian staff and some 2,400 UN Volunteers from over 
160 nations. The strongest personnel contributors are Bangladesh (10,862), Pakistan (10,733), 
India (8,783), Nigeria (5,837), Egypt (5,258), Nepal (5,186), Ghana (3,911), Jordan (3,769), 
Rwanda (3,663), Uruguay (2,516), Ethiopia (2,412), Italy (2,265)93. It can be said that there is 
a trend that it is rather developing countries being contributors than the developed ones when 
Italy is on the 12th of regional organisations and other states should considerably contribute to 
the complex peacekeeping.
Financially, it is all member states that contribute to peacekeeping operations. The 
General Assembly divides the expenses among the member states according to special 
financial chart taking into consideration economic wealth of member states. Member states 
with the permanent seat in the Security Council pay a larger sum as they have special 'special 
responsibility fo r the maintenance o f international peace and security’ 94 The 10 countries 
contributing most considerably for conflict crisis management are: United States (27.17%), 
Japan (12.53%), the United Kingdom (8.16%), Germany (8.02%), France (7.56%), Italy 
(5.00%), China (3.94%), Canada (3.21%), Spain (3.18%) and the Republic of Korea 
(2.26%).95 There are also countries that donate resources for UN operations in a different way, 
for instance in the means of transportation, supplies or personnel.
All in all, since the year 1999, the number of UN has increased considerably, they are 
larger, multi-faceted and complex. The number has increased mainly in African continent 
with approximately 72 000 peacekeepers, especially in the areas of Southern Sudan, Cote
93 United Nations Peacekeeping, Financing for UN Peacekeeping Operations: accessed at 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/financing.shtml (20/05)
94 United Nations Peacekeeping, Financing for UN Peacekeeping Operations: accessed at 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/financing.shtml (20/05)
95 United Nations Peacekeeping, Financing for UN Peacekeeping Operations: accessed at 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/financing.shtml (20/05)
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d'Ivoire, Liberia, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Darfur. Consequently, the demand 
for peacekeepers is even rising and contributions from the countries like Canada or entities 
like the European Union with long peacekeeping history, expertise and capabilities in military 
and logistics96. The EU bound to provide international force to the peacekeeping to the 
prevention of conflicts in the third countries. The personnel is composed of police forces 
especially trained for the given task. EU member states engaged themselves to provide 5000
Q7police officers out of this number 1400 might be available in 30 days .
2.5 UN demands and EU conditions
Generally, EU-UN level of cooperation depends on political and institutional structures from 
last years and there is still a question whether the commitments taken will ensure efficient 
cooperation between the actors. It has to be pointed out that first, the UN is asking the EU for
QO
contributions at operational level, which includes mainly peacekeeping . The EU members 
might theoretically get reluctant to UN peacekeeping, nonetheless the EU feels responsible for 
the commitment towards the UN Security Council in the issue of contribution to international 
crises solution finding, but according to its own principles and conditions. After few years of 
experience the EU proved to be a reliable partner, appreciated especially in the fields in which 
the UN does not feel so strong, i.e. rapid deployment. Secondly, the ESDP should not prefer 
peacekeeping in Europe to peacekeeping in Africa99, which means not only to criticise
96 PeaceBuild, Peace Operations Working group: accessed at: 
http://www.peacebuild.cei/documents/CanadaUNPKOE.pdf (30/04)
97 European Commission: Freedom, Security and Justice: A different type of peacekeeping for the EU: accessed 
at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/police/peacekeeping/fsj_police_peacekeeping_en.htm (25/04)
98 European Commission: Freedom, Security and Justice: A different type of peacekeeping for the EU: accessed 
at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/police/peacekeeping/fsj_police_peacekeeping_en.htm (25/04)
99 European Commission: Freedom, Security and Justice: A different type of peacekeeping for the EU: accessed 
at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/police/peacekeeping/fsj_police_peacekeeping_en.htm (25/04)
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conflicts, violence and belligerents but also actively provide troops, both for short-term and 
long-term operations. According to Richard Gowan, more than one decade after establishing 
the European security and defence policy '... the EU has generally left the United Nations to 
handle conflicts in the Middle East and Africa, though it has offered some support to UN 
missions in those areas. But with European forces heavily committed in Afghanistan and the 
Balkans -  and defence budgets being squeezed -  there is now a danger that diminishing EU  
support will undermine the effectiveness o f UN peacekeeping'.100 Obviously, the EU should 
become more engaged in UN peacekeeping as the reluctance might have negative impact on 
fragile states and European forces can make, according to Gowan, much difference in such 
countries, more than in Afghanistan for instance. The importance of EU engagement also 
comes from new rising powers like China or India which. On the other hand, the EU should 
urge on batter management of UN peacekeeping.
There exist principles treating cooperation of the EU with the UN and principles for 
EU intervention elaborated by the European Union in order to clarify its participation in 
conflict crisis management and providing civilian and military instruments. They are 
following:
• The EU will retain through the PSC the political control and strategic direction o f any o f its 
operations;
• This cooperation will take place on a case-by-case basis;
• There would be no automatic involvement;
100 - CER BULLETIN, ISSUE 66 The EU should do more to support UN peacekeeping in Africa EU should do 
more to support UN peacekeeping in Africa http://www.cer.org.uk/articles/66 gowan.htmlJune/July
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• The EU does not constitute a pool o f forces but can only intervene by conducting specific 
missions or operations, and there would be no earmarked forces to any stand-by 
arrangements101.
The EU also committed to the intervention under the UN mandate and the 
international law, the UN Security Council being the only organ with legal use of force 
(Article 53 of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter) and in the statement from the Goteborg 
summit it was claimed that “the development o f ESDP strengthens the Union’s capacity to 
contribute to international peace and security in accordance with the principles o f the UN 
Charter. The European Union recognizes the United Nations Security Council’s primary 
responsibility fo r  the maintenance o f international peace and security” .
Nevertheless, it has to be said that the principles mentioned have certain limiting 
influence on EU-UN cooperation in larger peace operations. Also, EU members tend to be 
reluctant after Srebrenica disaster to the UN-led peacekeeping. Nevertheless, there might be 
used the 'sub-contracting' model, '... by which the UN creates an operation, but subcontracts 
its implementation to the EU. In such a scenario, there is no formal link between the two
ffl 03institutions and the autonomy o f decision o f the EU is preserved” .
Also, the UN Secretariat does not dispose sufficient personnel for multinational forces, 
nor sufficient administration. Solution for such a problem was supposed to be deployment of 
small teams of military advisers, for instance as in case of Afghanistan within UNAMA.
101 Presidency report to the Goteborg European Council on European Security and Defence Policy, 11 June 2001, 
Brussels
102 Novosselof A (2004): 'EU-UN Partnership in Crisis Management', Developments and Prospects,
International Peace Academy, p. 8-11
103 Novosselof A (2004): 'EU-UN Partnership in Crisis Management', Developments and Prospects,
International Peace Academy, p. 8-11
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Basically, it is a UN military team that is source of information concerning security in the area 
and cooperating with ISAF.
2.6 Scenarios o f cooperation
The EU bound to get involved in a peacekeeping operation in Europe without a UN 
mandate and elsewhere outside Europe only under a UN mandate104. In such a case, there 
might be other countries involved in the leadership, the UN or other regional organizations. 
Such operation might be of a military or civilian character or composing of both types. The 
EU shall be autonomous in a decision-making process105. As already mentioned, there exists 
military and civilian crisis management which the EU distinguishes, the civilian being less 
restrictive. There are several options for civilian crisis management operations: First, 'EU 
Member States can contribute nationally to an operation led by international organizations, 
without any EU co-ordination. 'Second, 'EU Member States can contribute nationally to such 
an operation, but following EU consultations aimed at e.g. identifying opportunities to pool 
resources.' Third, 'A coordinated EU contribution could be provided to an operation led by 
an international organization.' Fourth, 'The EU could provide and lead a whole component 
(e.g. police) in an operation under the overall lead o f an international organization. A model 
could be a Kosovo type situation, with a pillar structure between different organizations and 
under the leadership o f one o f them.' Fifth, 'The EU could lead an operation, but with some 
components provided by international organizations with particular expertise and experience
104 Tardy T. (2008): 'United Nations -  European Relations in Crisis Management', International Forum for the 
Challenges of Peace Operations
105 McCallum B. (2009): 'EU Civilian Crisis Management : A Vehicle for EU International Actomess',
Dalhousie University, p. 4
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in relevant fie ld s '” Sixth, 'The EU could lead an autonomous operation.,106> In a
consequence, there might be determined several models for cooperation between the EU and 
the UN. The scenarios are following:
(1) The scenario does not require significant cooperation between the EU and the UN 
in terms of the operational level. An EU operation is mandated by the UN Security Council 
and might be conducted with NATO’s assets as well as without. Such scenario is denominated 
as 'SFOR model'107. Predominantly, according to this scenario the UN-EU cooperation is 
treated at the political level in order to make decisions coherent, this also involves resolution 
of the UN Security Council and the European Council Joint Action that are indispensable. 
There are two important issues: First, the UN is supposed to control operations that are UN- 
mandated which the UN Secretariat has not issued any regularized structures for such 
operations; and second, it essential to agree on common procedures concerning reporting to 
the Security Council for both the EU and the UN.
(2) The scenario divides the roles between the EU and the UN in the way an operation 
which is led by the EU is in charge of the security presence and the UN in charge of the 
civilian presence, so called KFOR model. This type is to some extent different from the 
scenario number one as in this case, it is liaison officers that are important for the EU-UN 
cooperation considering mainly the action on the ground. They assure information exchange 
of both decisions and actions of both actors and they are also supposed to solve 
misunderstanding and tensions between the two actors. Weakness of this scenario is seen in 
insufficient integration between the two types of command, military and civilian.
i°6 C0-0peration with international organizations in civilian aspects of crisis management”, Presidency
report to the Göteborg European Council on European Security and Defense Policy, June 2001.
107 Novosselof A. (2004): 'EU-UN Partnership in Crisis Management', Developments and Prospects,
International Peace Academy, p. 8-11
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Subsequently, so that the coordination is effective, endeavour must be taken by the heads of 
operation.
(3) The scenario of the third type is an operation led by the European Union, but it is 
the UN Security Council that is in charge of authorization and the authorisation is followed by 
a UN peacekeeping operation, so called Interfet model. The scenario is oriented at the 
solution of a rapid deployment concern of the United Nations. It should be also helpful to put 
the UN in order for own mission of a longer period. Normally, collaboration between the two 
actors is realized in the period when the transition takes place and the EU is constantly present 
on the ground despite the termination of the mandate. In a consequence the EU might provide 
some soldiers that are in charge of the operation even after the end of the mandate and provide 
them to the UN. UN operation would strengthen its position on the ground. It can be said 
certain prevention would be assured. Overall, this model is the one which is the most 
advantageous for the United Nations.
(4) Model number four treats considers contribution of EU headquarters of a UN 
peacekeeping operations. The example might be SHIRBRIG in the UN Mission in Ethiopia- 
Eritrea, this is so called UNMEE model. Nevertheless, applying this scenario, EU must face 
the problem of controlling its components in the operations led by the United Nations. In 
order to overcome such problem, the EU might send headquarters possible to deploy as one 
body as well as dividing an operation from the UN mission. It might be concluded that in case 
of such operation, it would be comparable to use the Interfet model.
(5) The scenario five suggest establishing a clearing house role which would be 
performed by the EU Political and Security Committee for UN peacekeeping operations, role 
of a clearing house would assure control over national contributions. This scenario is not very
48
probable to be realized as it is not very much more advantageous than the system of national 
contributions valid nowadays.
(6) According to the scenario six, the EU would contribute to the UN provision in 
terms of logistics and training. Such cooperation would be very practical and would include 
cooperation on the projects of a longer period of time. This would involve training, logistics 
supports to contingents as well as equipment provision. Special experts in peacekeeping 
operations would assist in such operations and financial aid to trust funds would be provided.
(7) Last but not least scenario treats the EU involvement in terms of provision very 
specific capabilities to the UN in the preparatory phase of an operation which means that 
cooperation of the EU and the UN is becoming stronger thanks to particular norms, concepts 
and procedures as well as rules of engagement, lessons learned, training criteria, legal aspects 
and liaison officers exchange. The European Union would be n charge of determining criteria 
that would be equivalent for both actors concerning peacekeeping, crisis management and
i  r jo
policing. Such development is naturally very slow .
Another concern for the EU-UN cooperation is the issue of confidential information 
since the UN does not dispose a system which would assure transmission of secured 
information, whereas the EU signed an information security agreement with NATO109. 
Consequently, there are some problems as a consequence of lack of information 
confidentiality110. In a need of transmitting confidential information the EU might use the 
service of a liaison officer of the Liaison Office of the EU General Secretariat as well as of
108 Novosselof, A. (2004): 'EU-UN Partnership in Crisis Management', Developments and Prospects, 
International Peace Academy, p. 8-11
109 NATO Publications (2002) : Chapter 4, The European Security and Defence Identity: NATO-EU Relations: 
accessed at http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb0403 .htm (05/05)
110 Novosselof, A. (2004): 'EU-UN Partnership in Crisis Management', Developments and Prospects, 
International Peace Academy, p. 8-11
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UNDPKO. As a result, information would be transmitted during planning as well as during 
on-going operations. Also, a question of reporting on UN-mandated EU operations to the UN 
Security Council has to be raised. For instance, in the EU's Operation Artemis, EU High 
Representative Javier Solana went to present the report from the mission to the Security 
Council in person; furthermore, he held a public debate in the Council which was proved to be 
more efficient than the methods used by SFOR, KFOR and ISAF where the Council receives 
very short reports once in three months111. Nevertheless, sending the High Representative in 
order to provide a report is an example of a case-by-case basis in case a crisis erupts and 
normally, such procedure has not been established yet112.
3 Operations
3.1 Artemis
Background
Ituri has been a problematic region in the north-east part of the country with numerous 
ethnic conflicts among ethnic groups fighting for access to land, mineral resources and control 
of local positions of power. The main conflicts caused death of approximately 50 000 people 
and escape of other 500 000 to other parts of Congo or to the neighbouring states between the 
years 1999 and 2003.113 Rival fractions were supported by sponsors from Kinshasa, Goma, 
Rwanda and Uganda. In 2002, the Luanda agreement was signed between the governments of 
Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Also, the withdrawal of the Ugandan army
111 Hendrickson C. Ryan, Strand Jonathan R and Raney Kyle L. (2007): Operation Artemis and Javier Solana: EU 
Prospects for stronger common and security policy, Strategic Thought
1.2 Novosselof A. (2004): 'EU-UN Partnership in Crisis Management', Developments and Prospects,
International Peace Academy, p. 10
1.3 Kees Homan, Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, European Commission: Faster and 
more united? The debate about Europe's crisis response capacity, May 2007, p. 151
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was planned after establishing an Ituri Pacification Commission and special strategy was set 
up for the conflict district of Ituri where the Iturians, the DRC and Ugandan governments as 
well as MONUC (the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo)114 and 
the broader international community took part in115. A new Iruri interim administration was 
created; nevertheless, it did not take long when the serious crisis erupted after the withdrawal 
of the Ugandan Peoples' Defence Force (IIPDF) in May 2003 and ILA ceased to function 
normally.116 After leaving of Ugandan troops, Lendu-based militias and the Hema Union of 
Congolese Patriots tried to take control over the town which caused escape of thousands of 
civilians gathering around MONUC headquarters and at the airport at the Urugayan battalion 
base.
Objectives
The objective of the mission was to assure the stabilisation of the security conditions, 
improve the humanitarian situation, guard the airport of Bunia and protect displaced 
population in the refugee camps in Bunia which is the capital of Ituri. Mandate was to provide 
an interim force for three months only until the transition to the reinforced United Nations 
Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo.117 EU troops mission also was to support UN 
troops in DRC in maintaining peaceful situation in the area and reduce acts of violence to 
minimum.
114 UN Peacekeeping: accessed: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monuc/mandate.shtml (25/05)
115 Hendrickson C. Ryan, Strand Jonathan R and Raney Kyle L. (2007): Operation Artemis and Javier Solana: EU 
Prospects for stronger common and security policy, Strategic Thought, p. 2
116 Kees Homan, Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, European Commission: Faster and 
more united? The debate about Europe's crisis response capacity, May 2007, p. 151
117 Kees Homan, Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, European Commission: Faster and 
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The operation was of special importance for the EU, because it was for the first time 
when EU troops operated outside the area of Europe without assistance from the NATO. 
Success in operation Artemis would therefore ensured higher credibility of the EU in 
peacekeeping missions118.
The Council of the European Union adopted a decision about the first fully 
autonomous crisis management operation outside Europe on 12th June 2003119. The French 
forces were the most involved in the operation. There were 1000 French troops, that means 
more than one half from total number of approximately 1800 troops. The second main 
contributor was Germany with around 350 troops. In addition, other European countries that 
provided troops were Sweden or the United Kingdom, while personnel form other EU states 
assisted at the Headquarters in Paris. However, the planning was realized by all, at the time 
15, EU Member States120.
Cooperation was eased by several transparent procedures using liaison officers of 
MONUC, common patrols, the Operation Commander's visit to New York, a mission of the 
operational headquarters sent to Bangladesh, logistics support given by Artemis to 
MONUC121 and relations both formal and informal worked at all levels. The transition took 
place between August 15 and September 1 for the handover to the UN's Ituri Task Force that 
was part of MONUC and was coordinated with UNDPKO, MONUC and the Bangladeshi
118 Nzongola-Ntalaja G. (2007): ‘Leasons Learned from the Artemis and EUFOR Operations in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo1, Security & Defence Agenda Discussion Paper The EU’s Africa Strategy: What are the 
lessons of the Congo mission? P. 9
119 Deheza, E. (2009):‘EU crisis management in Africa. The time for a ‘real adventure1 has come1, p.4
120 Nzongola-Ntalaja G. (2007): ‘Leasons Learned from the Artemis and EUFOR Operations in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo4, Security & Defence Agenda Discussion Paper The EU’s Africa Strategy: What are the
lessons of the Congo mission? P. 28
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Authorities as Bangladesh was the first deployed component of the Ituri Task Force. A French 
officer being the MONUC representative in the Itrui sector significantly eased the transition. 
There were several factors very important for successful transition, these were: progressive 
hand-over of points of control, military staff in Bunia, a planning program determined for 
different steps of the transition, logistics support by Artemis to MONUC, an operational 
mission sent to Bangladesh, visit of the Operation Commander to New York, liaison officers
199of MONUC that were attending field briefings and common patrols .
1st set o f criteria
It has to be said that the ‘Interim Emergency Multinational Force’ (IEMF) was not 
reluctant to use force when it proved to be necessary, not particularly against one of the ethnic 
group but against any of them which was about to threat the security of the population. The 
I’IEMF managed to establish security in Bunia and to weaken the capacities of the rival 
Lendu and Hema militias. In May 2003 the United Nations approved to deploy IEMF with 
Security Resolution 1484 on 30 May123 for the town of Bunia in order to compensate the 
withdrawal of 6 000 Ugandan troops and to fight against the violence between the rival Hema 
and Lendu ethnic groups. Nevertheless, during other tensions in Ituri, many civilians died 
which was internationally considered the UN was not responsible enough as there was a high 
risk of a new genocide in the Great Lakes region. MONUC was supposed to protect civilians 
under the mandate. The serious problem was that seven hundred Uruguayan battalion
122 Hendrickson C. Ryan, Strand Jonathan R and Raney Kyle L. (2007): Operation Artemis and Javier Solana: EU 
Prospects for stronger common and security policy, Strategic Thought, p. 2
123 Lianos, P. (2007): ‘European Strategic Culture in the Aftermath of Concordia, Artemis and Althea1, 
University of Leicester, p. 17
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abdicated its responsibilities and only a few peacekeepers and humanitarian workers managed 
to protect 5 000-8 000 civilians which were located near Bunia airport124.
The IEMF was tasked to coordinate with MONUC and to stabilize the security 
conditions and improve the humanitarian situation, to assure the protection of the airport, to 
assist the internally displaced persons in the camps in Bunia, and to contribute to the safety of 
the civilian population, United Nations personnel and the humanitarian presence in the 
town.”125
At the end of the operation, security in Bunia was assured and the militias of Lendu 
and Hema were weakened. As a result, some 60 000 refugees were able to return to the 
country. Also, more than 3 000 tonnes of humanitarian aid was delivered to Bunia.126 Still, the 
success of the mission was ambiguous as after the transition in September to the Bangladeshi- 
led MONUC, 65 people were massacred in Katshele, the town in northeast of Bunia, out of
1 97which majority were women and children. It can be therefore said that within its mandate, 
EU troops contributed to reduction of human suffering, nevertheless due to short length of the 
mandate, the effect that persisted after return of EU troops back to Europe was minimal. In 
addition, if the whole DRC is considered, reduction of suffering was also minimal. Even in 
areas closely surrounding Bunia brutal violations of human rights causing deaths of many
124 Lianos, P. (2007): ‘European Strategic Culture in the Aftermath of Concordia, Artemis and Althea1,
University of Leicester, p. 17
125 EU-UN: Communication around the emerging EU-UN relationship was assured through a brochure produced 
by the office of the Commission in New York (updated in 2004 under the title ‘The Enlarging European Union at 
the United Nations: Making Multilateralism Matter’) as well as through a dedicated website (http://europa-euun. 
org).
126 Kees Homan, Operation Artemis in thé Democratic Republic of Congo, European Commission: Faster and 
more united? Thé debate about Europe's crisis response capacity, May 2007, p. 151
127 EU Crisis Response Capability Revisited, International Crisis Group, Brussels, 17 January 2005, p. 47
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civilians occurred128. Again, this was caused by limited mandate that was specified for the 
area of Bunia.
Unfortunately, only a very limited area was under the operation and so, out of the area, 
the violent aggression against civilians erupted and atrocities continued. From this point of 
view, EU troops could not in broader scale influence spreading of the conflict beyond DRC 
borders as the mandate was limited only to the town of Bunia. The problem was also a very
1 9Qshort period of deployment, i.e. three months .
In can be said that the operation was successful in fulfilling its mandate, partially at 
least. EU troops contributed to maintenance of order in Bunia and secured the airport. By this, 
they provided significant assistance to MONUC and helped in fulfilling its mandate130. The 
Humanitarian assistance was also one of the aims of the mission which was successfully 
achieved as there was a civil-military liaison officer placed on the ground who provided link 
with humanitarian assistance in Bunia131. The liaison officer managed to create a good
132dialogue and ensured good cooperation with the humanitarian agencies . However, as 
mentioned earlier, the effect caused by EU forces was very temporary due to the limitations of
128 Nzongola-Ntalaja G. (2007) : ‘Leasons Learned from the Artemis and EUFOR Operations in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo1, Security & Defence Agenda Discussion Paper The EU’s Africa Strategy: What are the 
leasons of the Congo mission?, p.32
129 UN DPKO: Operation Artemis: The Lessons of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force’, Peacekeeping 
Best Practices U nit,, New York, October 2004, p. 11
130 Nzongola-Ntalaja G. (2007): ‘Leasons Learned from the Artemis and EUFOR Operations in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo4, Security & Defence Agenda Discussion Paper The EU’s Africa Strategy: What are the 
lessons of the Congo mission? P. 29
131 UN MONUC: accessed: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monuc/index.shtml (21/05)
132 Council of the European Union : EU military support of the MONUC during the election process in RD 
Congo, accessed at:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/esdp/89995 .pdf(25/05)
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mandate in space and time. Taking into consideration the long-lasting effect, shortly after 
retraction of EU troops from DRC the situation in the area worsened and MONUC was not 
capable of maintaining peaceful situation despite high number of troops and generous budget.
2nd set o f criteria
The first contact concerning possible EU-UN cooperation began in May 2003 when the 
situation in Bunia started to be critical. The UN Secretary General Kofi Annan announced that 
the UN demands help from all states capable of providing troops to intervene in DRC. France 
swiftly reported that it is ready to support UN troops under conditions that it would be 
provided with UN chapter VII mandate, African countries that were related to the conflict 
(DRC, Uganda, Rwanda) would agree with French intervention and that duration and range of 
the mandate would be strictly limited. Shortly after, the EU adopted its common position in 
which it expressed willingness to help MONUC and criticised violence in DRC. On May 19 
2003, Javier Solana was accredited by the EU Council to create a draft report concerning time 
necessary for EU troops to get ready for the mission. Although first estimations were several 
months, EU troops arrived in DRC approximately in one month. At the end of May 2003, the 
resolution 1484 was adopted by the UN Security Council describing EU mandate. It also 
called for collaboration from Congolese parties and other states in the region. The framework 
specifying goals of the operation was accepted by the EU Council at the beginning of June 
2003. Shortly after, Joint Action on the European Union military operation in the DRC was 
approved. It set Political and Security Committee (PSC) of the EU Council to exercise 
political control and strategic direction of the operation, while the Council in cooperation with 
Javier Solana covered decision-making process concerning objectives and the end of the 
operation. France was set as Framework Nation and Operational Headquarters was situated in 
Paris. The decision-making process was very quick and did not encounter greater obstacles. It
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is supposed that possible reason for such behaviour was political will to enhance ESDP in 
context of war in Iraq.
Operation Artemis proved to be a successful experiment of EU-UN cooperation and both 
organisations perceived it so. It can be said the EU completed the UN gap. The special UN 
force was formally created by the Security Council, its implementation subcontracted to the 
EU with absolutely balanced partnership. Only, the Security Council demanded the leadership 
of the force 'to report regularly to the Council through the Secretary-General, on the 
implementation o f its mandate'.133 At the preparatory phase, the UN complained it did not 
receive sufficient information from the EU, nevertheless communication improved during the 
operation and cooperation with MONUC was acceptable. One of the main successes of EU- 
UN cooperation was that MONUC was able to take over the operation in September as the 
EU mandate finished. It has to be said that effective communications and liaison for planning 
was assured. First shortcomings were solved and the EU took important measures to manage 
the issue.
EU-led multinational force managed to provide satisfactory logistical support and 
participated in the MONUC planning programme during the transition in September to the 
Bangladeshi-led MONUC forces (so-called the Ituri brigade)134
The UN requested to the EU to re-hat was not approved by the Europeans and it did threaten 
the credibility of MONUC135. Also, certain limits within the EU-UN relations appeared. The 
willingness to support through a separate operation and reluctance to support within the UN 
operation of EU member states was revealed. Javier Solana stated that MONUC ‘should have
133 UNSC Resolution 1484 (2003)
134 UN DPKO: 'Operation Artemis: The Lessons of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force’, Peacekeeping 
Best Practices U nit,, New York, October 2004, p. 13
135 UN DPKO‘Operation Artemis: The Lessons of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force’, Peacekeeping
Best Practices Unit, UN DPKO, New York, October 2004, p. 14
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a mandate and rules o f engagement similar to those o f the European Union force, i.e. a 
mandate under Chapter VII.,136 And also said that 'equipment and military resources 
necessary to accomplish its mission and implement the mandate and rules of engagement. It 
can be said in the Operation Artemis, the EU complemented the UN rapid capacity; 'battle 
group'l37concept was created. Also denominated ‘bridging model’, which means that the EU 
deploys a rapid force at the request of the UN and the UN gains time to deploy a new 
operation or to ameliorate and organize the current one. The EU has to have a possibility to 
deploy a capable appropriate rapid force.
Nevertheless, it has to be criticised there was not enough collaboration between the 
headquarters of the two actors as well within the field headquarters. It was known already 
before launching of the operation that there would be a lack of strategic transport. In the end, 
an aircraft from Ukraine was provided and rapid response capability was increased138. Also, 
there were shortcoming of better information technology, intelligence sharing.
Evaluation
The operation has a significant importance as it contributed to the EU-UN cooperation 
development. It was basically the first mission EU led autonomously without NATO 
contribution and where the EU served as a rapid reaction force for the first time and also the 
military operation outside Europe and first military operation where the EU and the UN 
cooperated. KFOR model and Interfet model were included in the cooperation as in the period
138 Michel, L., Nato and the EU, Stop the Minuet, It's Time to Tango!, EuroFuture,p. 90
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of transition EU military personnel stayed in the area even after the end of the mandate139. 
Both actors evaluated the operation as positive. At the beginning, the EU action was supposed 
to be a response to the UN Secretary-General that was endorsed by the Security Council. 
Before the deployment, the UN did not receive enough information from the EU, especially 
from the IEMF. This fact might have caused incident in the phase when both the EU and UN 
peacekeepers force were both deployed. In general, communication worked on different 
levels, i.e. New York, Brussels and on the ground. After Artemis was deployed, EU-UN 
cooperation was rather satisfactory as well as cooperation with the Ituri Task Force. The most 
important was successful cooperation of the EU and the UN Secretariat as well as with 
Bangladesh that was the main contributor to the Ituri Task Force so that MONUC could take 
over in September 2003 was successful. Also, the takeover was important from the exit 
strategy point of view140.
3.2 EUFOR RD Congo 
Background
At the end of the year 2005, UN asked the EU to deploy a support mission for the 
elections in the DRC which were to take place in summer 2006 in order to provide assistance 
to the UN operation MONUC. As a consequence, the EU deployed the mission EUFOR 
which was an autonomous military operation within ESDP, the operation was deployed after 
the agreement with the government of Congo and according to international law.
139 Nzongola-Ntalaja G. (2007): ‘Leasons Learned from the Artemis and EUFOR Operations in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo1, Security & Defence Agenda Discussion Paper The EU’s Africa Strategy: What are the 
lessons of the Congo mission? P. 25
140 Tardy T. (2005): EU-UN cooperation in peacekeeping: a promising relationship in a constrained 
environment, p.56
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The region of the African Great Lakes has been in inter-state conflict since the 1990s 
where approximately 5 million Congolese died and many were displaced141. In 1999 the 
Lusaka Accord and in 2002 the Pretoria and Sun City agreements which were to bring the 
region in a transition process were signed. In 1999, MONUC mission in order to make 
implementation of the accord easier was established. Transitional process of political aspects 
was assisted by Committee to Assist the Transition. The objective was to solve the conflict 
and lead to a transition towards sustainable peace and development142. The elections were 
important to reach the objective. The budget for the mission was more than one billion dollars 
and counted 18 380 personnel143. As a consequence, MONUC has been one of the most 
expensive missions. The mandate was comprised of four parts: first, implementation of the 
ceasefire agreement, second, monitoring and reporting of violations, third, DDRRR process 
(disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration), fourth transition 
to the organisation of credible elections144. MONUC was at the beginning smaller mission 
that counted 90 members. As the crisis was becoming more serious, MONUC significantly 
increased. There were also deployed UN agencies providing humanitarian assistance and 
different kinds of reforms. It is the EU that strongly supported the process of transition, also 
in terms of provision of institutional and technical support and approximately 750 million 
euro has been donated for the fight against poverty, support of economy and institution
141 Bavier, UN DPKO: 'Operation Artemis: The Lessons of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force’, 
Peacekeeping Best Practices U nit,, New York, October 2004, p. 11
142 UN Peacekeeping: MONUC: accessed at:
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monuc/mandate.shtml (25/05)
143 UN Peacekeeping: MONUC accessed at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monuc/facts.shtml 
(25/05)
144 J. (2008): ‘Congo War-Driven Crisis Kills 45.000 a Month’, Reuters, 22.01.2008
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building. The EU is supposed to be the most significant donor of humanitarian aid. 145There 
were other three ESDP missions of civilian character in DRC, these were EUPOL Kinshasa 
(2005-2007) that was to advice for the training of Congolese police forces; EUPOL RD 
Congo (since 2007) that was to support and assist in reforming of the security sector; and 
EUSEC RD Congo (since 2005) in order to provide assistance in establishing the standards of 
human rights, international humanitarian law, democracy, good public management and 
transparency. EU positive response and following support to the UN were according to its 
commitment in international community. It can be said, EU deployed EUFOR not only to 
support the UN's operation but also to demonstrate its capabilities146.
Objectives
The planning concerning help to MONUC forces began in March 2006, after 
acceptance of the resolution S/RES/1671 (2006)147 by the Council of the EU. Decision by the 
EU representatives to send troops to DR Congo came at the end of April 2006 and their main 
objective was set to help MONUC forces during the elections in case they would have 
problems in maintaining peace. Furthermore, EUFOR’s goal consisted of protecting lives of 
Congo civilians, securing the airport in the capital of DR Congo Kinshasa and preventing 
violence. Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP adopted only two days after the acceptance of the 
resolution states deterrence and evacuation as further objectives of EUFOR cooperation with
145 Comelis Wittebrod, 'Protecting the humanitarian space in Africa', in the EU's African Strategy: What are the 
lessons of the Congo Mission?, SDA Discussion Paper, 2007, pp. 24-26, p. 24. 
http://ec.europea.eu/echo/information/decisions/2006_en.htm
146 Major, C.(2008): 'EU-UN Cooperation in Crisis Management: the experience of EUFOR RD Congo in 2006, 
Institute of Security Studies, EU, p. 17
147 United Nation Security Council: Resolution S/RES/1671 (2006) http://daccess-
ods.un.org/TMP/7134335.04104614.html
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the UN. The operation began on 12 June 2006l48. The EU deployed approximately 2 400 
soldiers in DR Congo, that were divided into two parts; one part of them secured the area of 
Kinshasa, while the second part was placed in Libreville/Gabon. Additional 1 600 soldiers 
were prepared in Europe as a reserve. Troops came from 21 EU member states and Turkey 
and main contributors were France and Germany149.
The objectives were:
• To stabilize a situation
• To protect the civilians in case of violence
• To protect the airport in Kinshasa
• To ensure security of the personnel
• To deploy an operation in case of a threat150
1st set of criteria
There were several occasions when EUFOR had to prove its capacity to limit acts of 
violence in DRC, however, none of them was critical and tested fully EUFOR’s potential. 
Firstly, in August 2006, escalation of violence occurred shortly before presentation of 
provisional election results. Incidents continued even after announcement of the first round of 
the presidential election results. The most serious conflict occurred when presidential guards 
assaulted premises of vice president and presidential candidate Jean Pierre Bemba, 
nevertheless, EUFOR succeeded in separating both fighting parties and calm the situation.
148 Council of the European Union, 'EU military operation in support of the MONUC during election process in 
RD Congo', 10366/06 (Press 180), Luxembourg, 12 June 2006.
149 Ministère de la Défense, ‘Opération EUFOR RD Congo -  BENGA’ : accessed at :
www.defense.gouv.fr/ema/lavout/set/popup/lavout/set/popup/lavout/set/popup/content/view/ful1/24657 (05/05)
150 Major, C.(2008): 'EU-UN Cooperation in Crisis Management: the experience of EUFOR RD Congo in 2006, 
Institute of Security Studies, EU, p. 17
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Especially Spanish troops participated in this intervention. Another act of violence arose in 
September 2006, when presidential candidate Bemba’s TV station. Finally, EUFOR 
intervened during conflicts related to the second round of presidential elections and 
announcement of results in November 2006. Also, when presidential candidate Jean Pierre 
Bemba questioned Joseph Kabila’s victory at the Supreme Court of Justice, EUFOR 
contributed to stabilize the situations after several riots.
Overall, EUFOR was able to provide rapid reaction and reacted as a military deterrent 
force. Also EUFOR cooperated with MONUC and managed to limit the incidents and 
spreading of the violence151.
Nevertheless, there were some international observers, such as the International Crisis 
Group, that did not agree with this evaluation. They said that 'neither the MONUC nor EU
r 152troops in Kinshasa acted quickly enough to prevent the August violence from escalating' 
the International Crisis Group also said EUFOR would not have been successful if military 
challenges have been more serious. However, despite these objections, even International 
Crisis Group admits that EUFOR accomplished its mandate fully.
Right after departure of EUFOR, the guard of the president of Congo attacked the 
personnel protecting unsuccessful candidate and opposition leader Bemba, right in the centre 
of Kinshasa and violence escalated. Bemba managed to escape thanks to MONUC. It proves 
that EUFOR contributed to reduction of conflicts simply by its presence in the area and 
therefore to reduction of deaths and human suffering.
151 Major, C.(2008): 'EU-UN Cooperation in Crisis Management: the experience of EUFOR RD Congo in 2006, 
Institute of Security Studies, EU, p. 19
152 Intemaitonal Crisis Group, 'Securing Congo's Elections: Lessons from the Kinshasa Showdown', p.4. Espoir 
pour tous, 'La Braille de Kinshasa: MONUC et EUFOR impuissantes?', 23 August 2006, 
http://www.societecivile.cd/node/3032.
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In addition, EUFOR managed to create a positive image among local population. It
i r-3
published its own magazine called 'La Paillote' , which informed the inhabitants of DRC 
about EUFOR mission and was very well accepted by them. Furthermore, EU troops 
ameliorated its image by proving impartiality when they protected both successful presidential 
candidate and the opposition candidate and also by supporting local hospitals.
Despite the criticism, the EU served to Congo in many ways, i.e. political, economic, 
technical, diplomatic and military which should be still ameliorated. In fact, the task of 
EUFOR was to complement MONUC mission. The EU still showed the capability of military 
intervention which had benefits for international security and EUFOR still fulfilled the 
mandate from the UNSC Resolution. After the departure of EUFOR, the situation in DRC 
changed dramatically and violence in Kinshasa escalated causing more than 300 deaths154. 
However, the criticism seems inappropriate according to the mandate of EUFOR. The aim of 
EUFOR mission was not to maintain long-term stability; the task was merely to assist 
MONUC and help to stabilize the situation during presidential elections. From that point of 
view, EUFOR fulfilled its mission155.
It can be said the operation was restricted to the capital city Kinshasa due to its focus 
on presidential and parliamentary elections; therefore, the spread of conflict beyond state’s 
borders was improbable. There exist some criticisms that EUFOR was an inappropriate
153 Kinshasa : la communication de l'EUFOR RD Congo (2006), accessed at:
http://www.defense.gouv.fr/ema/operations exterieures/autres operations/congo/breves/31 10 06 kinshasa la 
communication de 1 eufor rd congo (15/05)
154 United Nations Human Rights Office,'Serious Human Rights violations committed in aftermath of Kinshasa 
events of March 2006', 7 January 2008, www.monuc.org/News.aspx?newsID= 16401.
155 Major, C.(2008): 'EU-UN Cooperation in Crisis Management: the experience of EUFOR RD Congo in 2006, 
Institute of Security Studies, EU, p. 19
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'cosmetic operation' which is typical for Europe and not for African dimension156 because of 
the time-frame and number of troops.
Overall, EUFOR achieved the mandate as it provided significant support for MONUC 
during the elections in Democratic Republic of Congo, which means that the operation was 
externally successful. EUFOR also did not have serious casualties. Secretary General High 
Representative Javier Solana said that the operation was 'a success, both in the way it has
'157been conducted and in its contribution to the overall conclusion o f the transition in DRC' . 
EUFOR managed to solve several situations when a conflict arose or it was highly probable it 
will arise. It gained most recognition for an intervention during August riots when EU forces 
in cooperation with UN troops managed to protect several diplomats that found themselves in 
the middle of the conflict. The success was also underpinned by the fact that EUFOR mandate 
was narrowed to only support MONUC troops in the area for a limited period of time (during 
presidential elections) in a limited area (the capital city Kinshasa). If the mandate had been to 
bring democracy and more importantly to maintain peace in DR Congo as a whole, the 
situation would have been more difficult and EU capacities would have been tested more 
profoundly.
2nd set of criteria
The political decision-making and planning process involved three interested groups, 
which are the UN, the EU and EU member states and focuses on setting criteria of the 
mandate. The UN formally asked for assistance in DR Congo in December 2005158 and
156 Jean-Yves Haine and Bastina Giegerich, 'In Congo, a cosmetic EU operation', International Herald Tribune,
12 June 2006
157 United Nations Security Council: Presentation by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP, on the 
Democratic Republic of Congo/EUFOR (2007),
www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/discours/92360.pdf
158 Ondarza. N (2008) : ‘EU Military Deployment -  An Executive Prerogative', p.19
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brought it to the attention of the EU presidency. A series of meeting between the EU and the 
UN took place both in institutional headquarters of both parties, which is in Brussels and New 
York, and in the capital city of DR Congo Kinshasa. The goal was simply to assess the 
ongoing situation in DRC and elucidate the mandate of EU forces. The military-strategic 
planning process began in March 2006 after the EU Council expressed its will to help UN 
forces. A formal agreement was established shortly after at the end of March 2006, stating 
that the EU will be independent in forming the EU forces and the coordination procedure was 
confirmed by an agreement between the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and the Secretary 
General of the EU Council Javier Solana159, by which the framework of EUFOR was set and 
stated high level of EU troops autonomy. The process was further delayed due to hesitations 
among the EU member states. At first, it was not clear who will provide the capacities as well 
as who will command the mission. The focus was placed on Germany, especially from French 
side, both in terms of commanding and providing troops, but Germany was not ready to make 
such a commitment. In January 2006, France came up with the idea of creating a battle group 
consisted of German and French troops, but German involvement in the mission would be 
much bigger then French, which means higher level of responsibility and also bigger financial 
burden. Eventually, the EU called on other member and candidate states as well as on third 
countries to participate in the battle group with a successful result. In the end, Germany and 
France agreed to provide one third of troops each and the rest was collected from other states. 
Contrary to France, where the decision was accepted by the president without further delays, 
Germany was divided about the involvement in the mission, but in the end German
159 United Nations Security Council: Presentation by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP, on the 
Democratic Republic of Congo/EUFOR (2007),
www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Dataydocs/pressdata/EN/discours/92360.pdf
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government agreed to deploy the troops160. Nevertheless, German parliament placed several 
conditions. Contrary to others, the activity of German troops was limited only to the territory 
of the capital Kinshasa and German government made it clear that they will not accept any 
prolongation of the 4-month mandate. Delays caused by the necessity of national 
governments1 agreements show that the ability of the EU as a whole to act is related to 
willingness of member states to participate in missions, both in terms of capacities and 
finances161.
As for the planning process, it was officially launched in March 2006. Firstly, the 
details about EUFOR mandate were set by the UNSC, UNDPKO, the EU and states that 
provided troops and later stated in the UNSC Resolution 1671, which was adopted on 25 
April 2006. Two days later, the EU adopted the JA319. However, the EU planning process 
was ready in advance, that is before the UNSC Resolution was adopted and the UN did not 
have possibility to amend it.
Basically, political planning and decision-making is how the mandate and forces are 
defined, that is the UN, the EU and the EU Member States. Nevertheless, the procedures 
were not fast enough within governments in the EU and consequently, Member States did not 
agree on capabilities and infrastructure provision fast enough. It can be said if the consultation 
mechanisms of the EU and UN had been used fast enough, the procedures would have been 
eased.
160 Major, C.(2008): 'EU-UN Cooperation in Crisis Management: the experience of EUFOR RD Congo in 2006, 
Institute of Security Studies, EU, p. 27
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Different understanding of EUFOR's mandate had an impact on the cooperation in the 
field as well as demands of the EU on its autonomy. There appeared problems because the 
agreed procedures were too complex and there were certain limitations of EUFOR due to the 
capacities and in the area of intelligence. The EU-UN cooperation in the field can be 
described as limited. One of the obstacles was the communication between EUFOR and 
MONUC in terms of sharing information. Another problem could be seen in EUFOR 
interoperability. As EUFOR consisted of troops from several countries, each country had its 
inner standards that differentiated from others and that influenced the inner cooperation.
Further differences can be found concerning the chains of command. While the 
MONUC command consisted of two parts, the command of EUFOR was more complex, with 
three centers influencing the course of the operation -  in Kinshasa, in Potsdam and in 
Brussels. Even though this approach assured better control, it proofed to be slow and 
inadequate for this case. Force Commanders of MONUC and EUFOR also had different 
competences163. While both of them worked in close cooperation, MONUC Force 
Commander had more competences than EUFOR Force Commander because he had to 
consult decisions with Operational Headquarters in Potsdam.
Although EUFOR clearly expressed that its autonomy has to be preserved during the 
mission, the UN troops regarded them as a subordinate unit. The impression was created by 
the mandate of EUFOR being ready to act in case of emergency. In addition, MONUC 
supposed that EU troops would provide assistance in areas where MONUC was not strong, 
for example dealing with crowds. Nevertheless, these expectations were not fulfilled
163 Nzongola-Ntalaja G. (2007): ‘Leasons Learned from the Artemis and EUFOR Operations in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo1, Security & Defence Agenda Discussion Paper The EU’s Africa Strategy: What are the 
lessons of the Congo mission?
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completely. However, EUFOR assistance proved to be valid in areas such as intelligence or 
rapid reaction capability and contributed to successful fulfilment of UN mandate.
Overall, support and logistics should not be underestimated as it includes essentials 
such as accommodation both for living and working, IT, medical support, air transport, water 
and food, equipment for office etc. During the operation MONUC was in charge of providing 
logistics, but due to different approaches and practices, this point did not work properly. 
Misunderstandings and insufficient provision of products for EUFOR occurred frequently and 
therefore logistics is considered disappointment of the operation164.
Evaluation
Overall, the operation of EUFOR was a success. EU troops helped significantly to 
maintain stability during the operation and what is equally important, with no loss of life. In 
addition, it impeaches the capacity of EUFOR to solve conflicts of larger scale. In addition, 
EUFOR was criticized for having only a minor share of success of the operation. Moreover, 
according to some opinions EU troops did not contribute to maintenance of peaceful situation 
in a long-term scale. After the departure of EUFOR, the situation in DRC changed 
dramatically and violence in Kinshasa escalated causing more than 300 deaths165. However, 
the criticism seems inappropriate according to the mandate of EUFOR. The aim of EUFOR 
mission was not to maintain long-term stability; the task was merely to assist MONUC and 
help to stabilize the situation during presidential elections. From that point of view, EUFOR 
fulfilled its mission successfully. Nevertheless, still, it can be said the result of the operation is 
not clear from the following reasons as EUFOR was successful with fulfilling the mandate
164 Major, C.(2008): 'EU-UN Cooperation in Crisis Management: the experience of EUFOR RD Congo in 2006, 
Institute of Security Studies, EU, p. 23
165 United Nations Human Rights Office, 'Serious Human Rights violations commited in aftermath of Kinshasa 
events of March 2006', www.monuc.org/News.aspx?newsID=16401
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which is a proof of external effectiveness of the operation, nevertheless, EUFOR-MONUC 
cooperation was at some points limited and sometimes the operations was affected by the 
problems upcoming from this fact. First of all, there appeared to be shortcomings in the EU- 
UN cooperation considering not sufficient cooperation mechanisms and problems with 
coordination. The EUFOR-MONUC cooperation suffered from lack of information exchange, 
communication, insufficient procedures that committed EUFOR to MONUC support, lacks in 
logistics as well as EU pressure on its autonomy. Nevertheless, this fact caused useless costs. 
Internally the EUFOR was influenced by the insisting of the Member States to participate on 
decision-making, i.e. 21 countries wanted to take part which negatively affected smooth 
course of the operation. Also, internal tensions in the EU also negatively affected cooperation 
mechanism with the UN. There also appeared some shortcomings in the issue of command as 
EUFOR personnel claimed there were too many both European and national advisors and so 
the cooperation had to deal with the problems of interoperability, i.e. internal EU cooperation 
and different European entities within EUFOR and also, cooperation between EUFOR and 
MONUC, the EU and the UN.
The reason why the cooperation between the EU and the UN still worked and the 
mission was successful despite all the challenges it was also due to close contacts between 
the personal contacts, liaison officers and a joint working group that was to implement 
confidence measures between the local parties. Last but not least, favourable conditions for 
the operation had also a favourable impact on the missions. The Congolese population 
became very interested in the elections which EUFOR profited from. The operation was still 
successful.
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4 General evaluation
Cooperation between the EU and the UN is based on bilateral basis, but sometimes, 
the main obstacles seemed to be the cooperation between member states of each institution on 
one side and between the EU and the UN on the other side which is connected with the fact 
the two organizations consisted of too many members. This turned the negotiations into 
multilateralism on EU and UN level; needless to say it made the decision-making and 
cooperation process even more complex and both entities had difficulties to harmonize the 
cooperation within its members in order to strengthen the cooperation on the bilateral EU-UN 
basis. Secondly, both entities were developing in a different manner which significantly 
influenced their organizational structures and so, major differences had negative impact on 
military operations themselves.
Thirdly, forces taking part in joint military operations consisted of several national
troops and therefore operational capacity was automatically lowered. Consequently, a ‘mixed’
force had then difficulties to operate in a more efficient way than trained national troops and
there were not sufficient measures which would have reduced the impact of this inevitable
loss of efficiency. Also, the cooperation between the EU and the UN was not balanced enough
which caused concerns mainly at the EU side which strived to be autonomous; nonetheless, its
autonomy sometimes affected the smooth process of transition and cooperation. The
European Union also did neither take enough initiatives nor provided enough human
resources for operations led by the UN which criticised insufficient provision of qualified
personnel. Even though the number of people prepared to serve in operations increased, it was
not enough for an achievement of desired results without effective crisis management. There
was still insufficient harmonization of procedures and both entities had problems to reach a
common consensus when a critical situation occurred and there was a risk of an upcoming
conflict. Accordingly, such a process might have saved many obstacles, the level of
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coordination might have been elevated and all the operation might have turned out to become 
more efficient.
Generally, cooperation and harmonization between the two institutions, the 
communication was not developed enough. Should the joint operation have been a success, 
there would have to be better information exchange and sharing of best practices. Better 
information basis would have most certainly contributed to the capacity of swift reactions if 
there had been an uprising conflict. In addition, improvement in this area would have further 
increased mutual harmonization. Nevertheless, in order to improve the information, there was 
not a sufficient technical background set up between the two institutions. Communication was 
limited to the highest posts in both entities, and was not encouraged also between personnel of 
both institutions so that the most fruitful results possible were achieved. EU-UN headquarters 
did not consider enough creating a secure communication channel, but of course, a 
considerable amount of money invested in such technology would have been required which 
presented considerable obstacle.
As mentioned before, the main obstacle of successful mission operating proved to be
the level of cooperation. The lack of coordination negatively contributed to results of joint
operation or at least decelerated the whole progress. In context of enhancing partnership
between the two organizations, a simple logistic step could be undertaken. The presence of
representatives in both institutional headquarters should have been expanded; that means
more EU representatives should have been sent to UN headquarters in New York and vice
versa. Such seemingly insignificant measure could have liven up relations between both
entities and enhance mutual cooperation. As far as the EU is concerned, it also did not
promote itself more intensively enough so that its contribution to joint missions would not
have been overshadowed by the UN. For example, the EU did not provide enough resources
to the General Secretariat of the European Council which would have be used to finance
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missions. Furthermore, there was a moment in history of joint EU-UN operations when EU 
voice became louder than before in EU-UN relations. It was during French presidency in 2000 
when former EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier 
Solana actively participated at the UN Security Council meeting. The event could serve as a 
good example of further cooperation and the EU should aspire to promote its position in 
similar manners, especially when operations are led by UN in cooperation with the EU. 
Furthermore, both institutions should seek to adjust their operational procedures to become 
more inter-compatible in order to prevent possible discrepancies in military operations.
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5 Conclusion
The European Union is strongly committed to multilateralism and recognition for the UN 
system and strives to make cooperation within the global system as efficient as possible which 
has the influence on its effectiveness as well as legitimacy and decision-making. That is the 
reason why EU crisis management is closely interconnected with the UN structures. From my 
research, it has come out that after participation in several operations and commitment to take 
part in others, the European Union has already proved that it is a key player on the world 
scene in crisis management as it has shown its high attention to world crises, not only in 
Europe. It can be said that the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo tested the approach 
of the European Union to crisis management in the cooperation with the United Nations as the 
role of the EU in the crisis management significantly strengthened. On the Congolese crisis, 
the demonstration of the coordination between the EU and the UN in crisis management was 
provided including two military operations, i.e. Artemis and EUFOR RDC to support the UN 
Mission MONUC.
It needs to be acknowledged there are three actors; these are the United Nations, the European 
Union and the EU Member States. It is crucial for the European Union to promote its 
coherence and internal cooperation which is also valuable for the United Nations.
It can be summarized that already after the operation Artemis, the EU and the UN 
realized their cooperation was successfully operational, complementary and they could reach 
common objectives. Since then, the EU has been an important partner in crisis management; 
even though, sometimes it the autonomy is demanded from the EU side which might cause 
difficulties for an operation. In general, the partnership brings numerous advantages for both 
actors. EU brings rapid deployment which it is better at and on the other hand, the EU gains 
experience in peace stabilization, planning, coordination at all levels, exchange of
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information, reporting, joint decision-making as well as summarizing and gaining experience 
from learnt lessons.
Nevertheless, there are several issues on the agenda that still concern the United 
Nations and the European Union. Even though, in general, the operations have been 
successful, there is still some ambiguity about the overall results and a discussion how the 
UN, the EU were able to cooperate and manage to cohere coordination despite major 
differences such as in their political agendas, institutional procedures and objectives. It has to 
be added the officials from both military and civilian operations checking the situation 
criticized the course of the cooperation and stated not all the important information from the 
previous peacekeeping operations were accepted and lessons learnt adopted and implemented. 
They also expressed their worries and doubts concerning motivation to deal with the 
problems. The issue is important from both political and strategic point of view and is notably 
challenging for future cooperation of the actors166. From the research, it comes out that the 
success can be achieved only when actions are taken in a coherent way. And, moreover, such 
coordination shall be recognized by both actors as well as by their member states. Still, the 
EU needs to deal with complexity and difficulty of crisis management, to make its action, 
command and mechanism more coherent with the UN crisis management in order to enforce 
and maintain peace, maintain law and order and to build peace efficiently. At the political 
level, both entities proved to be complementary. The EU should become stronger within the 
UN structure; the UN needs EU for its crisis management. More profound cooperation would 
positively influence results of joint operations and therefore both partners should exert effort 
to interconnect in areas such as exchange of information and personnel, strategic preparations, 
assessment of results, special training or crisis management.
166 'la contribution de l'UE a la sécurité du procesus electoral en république démocratique du congo', Les cahiers 
de Mars, no. 191, 2007, pp. 89-92
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It can be also said that overall share of the EU and crisis management might be higher, mainly 
with the concentration on the African continent. Both the European Union and Africa bound 
to cooperate to fight against common problems, both global and regional. They committed to 
strive to achieve Millennium Development Goals. There are without any doubts several 
challenges in mutual EU-UN relationship on which both institutions should focus. Both 
entities must realize that the relationship between them has to stay balanced in order to 
maintain partnership available of future development. The disparities of the two actors, the 
EU and the UN are mainly of cultural, organisational and structural character which will, 
nevertheless, remain the same in the future. It might be estimated that cooperation between 
the two actors, the EU and the UN will always tend to be on the lower level than a national 
deployment. This problem might be gradually diminished but probably not resolved 
completely.
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6 Appendice
MONUC Facts and Figures
Source: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monuc/facts.shtml
Current authorization until 30 June 2010
Security Council resolution 1925 of 28 May 2010
Strength 
Initial authorization
• 5,537 troops
• 500 military observers
• Appropiate civilian component
Current authorization
Security Council resolution 1856 of 31 July 2007
• 19,815 military personnel
• 760 military observers
• 391 police
• 1,050 personnel of formed police units
• Appropiate civilian component
Current (30 April 2010)
• 20,819 total uniformed personnel
o 18,884 troops 
o 712 military observers 
o 1,223 police
• 991 international civilian personnel
• 2,749 local civilian staff
• 634 United Nations Volunteers
Note: Statistics for international and local civilians are as of 31 March 2010 
Country contributors 
Military personnel
Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, 
Canada, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, France, Ghana, Guatemala, India, 
Indonesia, Ireland, Jordan, Kenya, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mongolia, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Romania,
Russian Federation, Senegal, Serbia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Tanzania, Tunisia, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Yemen and Zambia.
Police personnel
Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, 
Egypt, France, Guinea, India, Jordan, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Romania, Russian Federation, 
Senegal, Sweden, Togo, Turkey, Ukraine and Yemen.
Fatalities
• 99 troops
• 6 police
• 10 military observer
• 12 international civilian
• 30 local civilian
• 157 total 
Financial aspects
• Method of financing: Assessment in respect of a Special Account
• Approved budget (1 July 2009 - 30 June 2010): $1,350.00 million
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7 Abstract
The focus of this research is in the area of EU-UN relations crisis management, more 
specifically, the role which the European Union plays within the UN structure as a contributor 
to the UN crisis management as well as to numerous peacekeeping missions. This occurs at 
the time when the UN needs to face the crises and seek support of other world players to carry 
out the missions so that a chance to succeed in these difficult tasks would be higher. The 
research approach adopted in the thesis includes qualitative analysis and case study methods. 
The findings from this research provide evidence that the European Union is a competent 
partner for the United Nations in the field of crisis management, in spite of different policies 
and agendas. The main conclusion is that the European Union, after participation in several 
operations and commitment to take part in others, the organisation has already proved that it 
is a key player on the world scene in crisis management as it has shown its high attention to 
world crises, not only in Europe.
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